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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is a study of Martin Heidegger’s thinking on education, a
neglected thematic in the extensive philosophical literature of Heidegger scholarship.
Discussion of Heidegger and education inevitably evokes the fault of Heidegger’s
involvement in National Socialism at Freiberg University. However, the core of this
dissertation project is to show that Heidegger contributes favorably to our philosophical
thinking on education. Further, this study aims to suggest that to consider the matter of
‘Heidegger and education’ only in the dark light of the act and political implications of
Heidegger’s becoming the first Nazi rector of Freiburg University is to miss Heidegger’s
central educational concern: that of teaching and learning the thinking and gathering of
being itself.
My central argument to this end is that in Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger
speaks a radical vision of education as preparation for overcoming the crises and plights
of modernism, including those of late-modern education. More specifically, as Heidegger
envisions it, this education would prepare future human beings 1) for returning to the
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original domains of questioning, to philosophy and philosophizing at its root; 2) for
thinking in those original domains apart from, and even other than, the thinking of
modern erudition, including philosophy; 3) for an ontological overcoming of the
ontotheological essence and ground of the western philosophical tradition as
metaphysics; 4) for thinking another beginning for philosophy, philosophizing, and the
worlds of intelligibility and structures such a beginning would unfold.
I situate the main of my discussion in Heidegger’s tumultuous and transitional
middle period, 1929-1938, specifically in both 1930/1940 studies of Plato’s Cave
Allegory 1936-38 and Heidegger’s second masterwork Contributions to Philosophy (of
the Event). By 1929, and in terms of plight (Not) and nihilism, Heidegger is beginning to
thematize his thinking on the university and need for philosophical education to answer
late-modern plight.. I understand Contributions to Philosophy to present the first
thoroughgoing expression of Heidegger’s mature philosophy of education as that which
prepares human being for the thinking and gathering of being itself, which Heidegger
calls Ereignis.
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NOTES ON TRANSLATION AND CITATION
Translation:
Translations of Heidegger’s works are reproduced in the form employed by the
source of the quotation, unless otherwise stated. Greek words are transliterated and
standardized for the sake of consistency. German terms are reproduced according to the
form employed by the source quoted.

Citation:
In-text citation of Heidegger’s works will appear by means of abbreviation and
page number referring first to the English translation, followed by /, and second to the
German Gesamtausgabe.
As example, (CP 32/GA65: 38) refers to Contributions to Philosophy (Of the
Event). R. Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-Neu, trans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2012. p. 32 and Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 65: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). F. W.
von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1989, p. 38.
For a list of abbreviations used for works by Heidegger, see page 132.
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The readiness for questioning consists in a certain maturity of
existence…it is also not a matter of finishing as soon as possible, but
instead of holding out for years in uncertainty for the critical confrontation
with matters under investigation, of being free to reject every hasty
answer.
—Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research
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INTRODUCTION

As the title of my dissertation study forecasts, and forecasts not sarcastically but
sincerely, I aim to consider Heidegger’s favorable contributions to our thinking on
education. I do think there is good in the juncture of Heidegger’s thinking and
education—even as any discussion of Heidegger, especially Heidegger and education,
inevitably evokes the fault of Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism, his
becoming the first Nazi Rector of Freiburg University in 1933, his anti-Semitism, and his
unforgettable silences and sayings afterwards.
How to make sense of Heidegger’s fault, what sense to make, are how to respond
to that sense—and, then, how to read and respond to Heidegger’s philosophical work, his
philosophy, and his legacy—are each additional multi-dimensional problems within the
larger problem of Heidegger’s Nazism. The problems of Heidegger’s Nazism are
especially relevant and difficult in a discussion of Heidegger’s contributions to our
thinking on education, because the problems’ epicenter was in a university and its
community, the core of educational provision and activity itself, and because Heidegger’s
violations of educational integrity were multiple.
These problems have drawn prodigious (some might say exhaustive) energy and
attention (scholarly and not) in the thirty years since the publication of Victor Farías’s
Heidegger and Nazism in 1987 and its declared ‘exposé’ of Heidegger’s Nazism
provoked an all-hands-on-deck confrontation of Heidegger’s political involvements.1
While this all-hands confrontation has yielded deep and wide-ranging benefits for our
reckoning with Heidegger the man, Heidegger as thinker, Heidegger as a legacy of
1

See Jesús Adrián Escudero’s fine account of initial and later confrontations with Heidegger’s political
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thought-ways and works, and other important thought-problems, the confrontation has
brought forth troubling features of human being and activity beyond those of Heidegger
and his political involvements themselves. The exposé hype and shoddy scholarship of
Farías’s book introduced a sensationalist element to our confrontation and more receptive
encounters with Heidegger that hasn’t gone away, as the initial overdramatized response
to the publication of Heidegger’s so-called Black Notebooks affirmed. The sensationalist
element has quieted and retreated for long stretches—the “L’Affaire Heidegger” giving
way to the “Heidegger Case” (to indicate more sober, if not impartial, scholarly
adjudication of Heidegger’s political involvements) to the more superficially benign
“Heidegger Controversy”—yet that element persists. And it persists in a way that leaves
the Heidegger waters, already legitimately tainted by the problem of Heidegger’s
Nazism, further tainted if not toxic.

Given the intense notoriety of the “problem” of Heidegger and education, many
Heidegger scholars—defenders and critics alike—would likely think my project to
consider Heidegger’s contributions to education to be a fool’s errant errand, if not
irresponsible in many senses. One such irresponsibility would surely be my failure to
disqualify any Heidegger contributions not only for the reason Heidegger critic Richard
Wolin speaks, that “in the 1930s, Heidegger himself placed the decision about the truth of
Being as he sought it in a political context,” but also, and perhaps even more so, for the
reason that Heidegger placed the decision about the truth of Being as he sought it in a
political and educational context. He appropriated the matters and activities of education
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for the “priority of the political,” which in the Nazi university also named the Nazi
education policy that made political indoctrination compulsory in the classroom.2
But it will be my project here to show that Heidegger’s National Socialism, Nazi
involvements, anti-Semitism, and educational ‘sin’ notwithstanding, his thinking on
education is a favorable contribution indeed. These contributions include Heidegger’s
insight into the essence of education, his seeking what is most proper to education, his
phenomenology of the activities of education (such as thinking, learning, teaching), his
depiction of what is essential to the proper situation and place of education, and his
prescient identification of educational plights that are today even more confirmed.
Heidegger’s penetration and conveyance of educational matters that are rarely deeply
grasped or said is further favorable contribution indeed.
Additionally, I aim to suggest that considering the matter of ‘Heidegger and
education’ only in the dark light of the act and implications of Heidegger’s becoming the
first Nazi Rector of Freiburg University is to miss Heidegger’s central concern: that of
teaching and learning the thinking and gathering of being. The conjoining of teaching
and learning and thinking and gathering in my formulation of Heidegger’s central
concern is intentional. Characteristic of Heidegger’s mature philosophy of education—or
perhaps more properly, his mature philosophical educating (which includes selfeducating)—is that teaching and learning and thinking and being draw so near to one
another in belonging together that each is facet of the other and also the same. Teaching
is learning is thinking is gathering of being. Gathering is thinking is learning is teaching
of being. Remarkably few have considered favorably, constructively, that philosophy and
pedagogy in Heidegger’s work “belong together” and are the “same,” as Heidegger’s
2

See Julian Young, “Poets and Rivers: Heidegger on Hölderlin’s ‘Der Ister,’” 408-9.
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thinks identity (ID 23ff/GA11: 27ff). Few have shown that for Heidegger, philosophy in
its most essential human happening, which Heidegger calls Ereignis, is pedagogical.

I situate the main of my discussion in Heidegger’s tumultuous and transitional
middle period, 1929-1938, and in Heidegger’s 1936-38 second masterwork Contributions
to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA65). By 1929, and in terms of plight (Not) and nihilism,
Heidegger is beginning to thematize his thinking on the university and on the place of
philosophy in the university. I understand Contributions to Philosophy to present the first
thoroughgoing expression of Heidegger’s mature philosophy of education as that which
prepares human being for Ereignis. That said, I see Heidegger’s 1951-2 lecture course
What is Called Thinking? and 1953-4 imaginary conversation “A Dialogue on Language:
between a Japanese and an Inquirer” to hold the most mature expressions of Heidegger’s
philosophical educating—the latter especially because of its depiction and discussion
(both implicit and explicit) of the educative roles of language, art, and Gelassenheit in
teaching, learning, thinking, and gathering of the meaningful presence of being. I also
include in my discussion Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s Cave Allegory, which
appears with some variation in three works from Heidegger’s middle period: The Essence
of Truth (1930-1), Being and Truth (1933-34), and “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”
(1930/1940).3 Heidegger’s interpretations of Plato’s Cave Allegory are among his more
explicit writings on education and indicate his convictions on paideia as the essence of

3

Though “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” written in 1940, delivered as a lecture in 1941, and published in
1942, is later than the purported ‘end’ of Heidegger’s 1929-38 middle period, I include it in my study
because its origins are in the 1930 lecture course The Essence of Truth and its concerns are arguable
more ‘middle’ than ‘later.’
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education and the dynamic role of the negation of that essence as apaideia, or our
educational plight.
As I have forecasted, the core of my dissertation project is to show that Heidegger
contributes favorably to our philosophical thinking on education, and contributes beyond
the negative example of what-not-to-do in Heidegger’s Nazi involvements at Freiberg
University. My central argument to this end is that in Contributions to Philosophy,
Heidegger speaks a radical vision of education as preparation for overcoming the crises
and plights of modernism, including those of late-modern education. More specifically,
as Heidegger envisions it, this education would prepare future human beings for 1)
returning to the original domains of questioning, to philosophy and philosophizing at its
root; 2) thinking in those original domains apart from, and even other than, the thinking
of modern erudition, including philosophy; 3) an ontological overcoming of the
ontotheological essence and ground of the western philosophical tradition as
metaphysics; 4) thinking another beginning for philosophy, philosophizing, and the
worlds of intelligibility and structures such a beginning would unfold.
I argue that Contributions to Philosophy contributes to our philosophical thinking
on education in several primary ways. 1) Contributions locates the ontological root of
educational plight in the metaphysical standpoint that late-modern human beings take on
entities and their being. 2) Contributions lays forth an educative way for realizing an
alternative standpoint. 3) Contributions discloses Heidegger’s idea and image of
Ereignis, which indicates the essence of learning as a disclosing realizing of meaningful
presence, akin to a flash of insight drawing together mind and what-is, neither
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subjectively nor objectively. 4) Contributions points human being toward a way of
thinking that is itself human being in its essence.

My method is a combination of historical study and hermeneutical philosophy,
especially interpretive encounter with Heidegger’s texts, his “thought-ways”
(Denkwegen) as he called them, and their thinking. The spirit of my approaching
Heidegger is one indicated by Jacques Derrida, expressed in a different way by
Heidegger himself, and, in one sense at least, scorned recently by Peter Trawny, editor of
Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte (Black Notebooks). First, though I am convinced of the merit
of encountering first-hand, without secondary or biographical mediation, the phenomena
of “thought-ways” and other works expressive of intelligibility, imagination, skill, in the
case of Heidegger and study of Heidegger and education, to bracket out the bright
darkness of Heidegger’s Nazi involvements at Freiburg is to call forth censure that would
eclipse whatever of Heidegger’s favorable contributions I may disclose. But this isn’t a
study meant to explain or even to reckon with the facts of Heidegger’s Nazi
involvements. Instead, I will follow Derrida, who in responding to the matter of relating
“these ‘facts’ to Heidegger’s ‘text,’ to his ‘thinking,’” called for those “who condemn
unequivocally both Heidegger’s Nazism and his silence after the war, but who are also
seeking to think beyond the conventional and comfortable schemas, and precisely to
understand.”4 The conventional and comfortable schema since the publication of Farías’s
1987 “exposé” has been to avoid engaging Heidegger’s texts, his thinking—especially on
education—in any way other than in the bright darkness of Heidegger’s Nazi
involvements.
4

See Jacques Derrida, “Heidegger, the Philosopher’s Hell,” 181-2.
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My method also is to follow Heidegger’s characterization of encountering a
thinker’s thought, rather than countering it, and to do so, as Derrida guides, in order to
understand Heidegger at his encounter of the matters he thinks. In 1951, having already
experienced the influence of his Nazi problem on the viability of his philosophical work
and legacy—or, perhaps, delivering a variation on what had been from the beginning of
his lifework a principle in his own hermeneutic practice and his teaching of it—
Heidegger says,
One thing is necessary, though, for a face-to-face converse with the
thinkers: clarity about the manner in which we encounter them. Basically
there are only two possibilities: either to go to their encounter, or to go
counter to them. If we want to go to the encounter of a thinker’s thought,
we must magnify still further what is great in him. Then we will enter into
what is unthought in his thought. If we wish only to go counter to a
thinker’s thought, this wish must have minimized beforehand what is great
in him. We then shift his thought into the commonplaces of our know-itall presumption. (WCT 77/ GA8: 83)
Some would take Heidegger here to proclaim his own greatness, to speak a
disturbing disavowal or trivializing of the relevance of his Nazism, and even to impose a
philosophical shaming of anyone who would to “minimize beforehand what is great in
him” either by reading his greatness—his thought—only by the commonplaces of
presumptions about ‘his’ National Socialism and/or by insisting that Heidegger own and
atone for his Nazi involvements beyond the avowals and intimations of error that exist.5

5

These include Heidegger’s Das Spiegel interview (DS 313-333/GA16: 652-683), “Letter to the
Rector of Freiberg University, November 4, 1945” (see Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy,
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Some too, such as Peter Trawny, would take Heidegger’s 1951 saying from What is
Called Thinking? as one example among many of Heidegger prescribing the reading of
Heidegger and therein attempting control of the reception of Heidegger, man, works, and
legacy. These “some” may be right.
In Trawny’s recent discussion of the problem of ‘how to read Heidegger, ”
specifically how to read the Heidegger after the Black Notebooks, Trawny characterizes
“Heideggerian” readers as scholastic-lovers blindly obedient, assuming that “Heidegger’s
self-interpretation must the beginning of every engagement” with him, following “the
‘master’s’ ‘instructions’” in interpreting him, and so incapable of freedom of thought that
“they are not philosophers and never can be.”6 In other words, these “Heideggerian”
readers are so near to Heidegger’s encounter that they are inevitably collusive (in
Heidegger’s Nazism and anti-Semitism is the subtext). Instead of the Heideggerian
reading, Trawny calls for philosophical reading of Heidegger, which “the freedom of
thought which inscribes itself in every philosophy. The freedom of philosophy counts for
more than obedience to a beloved thinker.”7 I see a curious paradox in Trawny’s
philosophical reading: were Trawny to look to the master’s instructions in Heidegger’s
1951 saying from What is Called Thinking? quoted above, he would see Heidegger
calling readers of great thinkers to go to the encounter of a thinker’s thought, magnify
what is great in him, and then enter into what is unthought in his thought. That unthought
is what Trawny calls “the freedom of thought which inscribes itself in every philosophy”;
the unthought is thinking to be thought free beyond the limit (or self-interpretation) (or

61-66), “Documents from the Denazification Proceedings Concerning Martin Heidegger” (see
Brainerd, “Heidegger and the Political,” 581-611).
6
See Peter Trawny, “Heidegger, World-Judaism and Modernity,” 5-6.
7
See Peter Trawny, “Heidegger, World-Judaism and Modernity,” 6.
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instructions) of a thinker’s self-understood thought. And as Heidegger tells us, it can
happen only if a thinking reader draws so near to a thinker as to encounter him in his
greatness and then leap through the doorway in that thinking to think that thinker’s
unthoughts. That, as Heidegger depicts it for us, is both to encounter both a great thinker
on his own terms, by his own encounter with what-is in his thinking, and is to look for
the doorway to think freely by merit of that encounter beyond that thinker encountered
and his thought.
I am still learning to encounter Heidegger in his encounter, specifically in his
encounter with education—thinking, learning, teaching. In this study, it will be my
method here to follow Derrida’s guideline and the choice Heidegger speaks to go to the
thinker’s encounter (in this case the thinker I encounter is Heidegger). I do so by
following Heidegger’s indications for how to read him (for they invite and call for
compliance, as exemplified above, but do not demand subservience as Trawny regards
them) and may magnify his greatness along the way, though I am too much a beginner
still to see, much more go through, Heidegger’s unthought thought and its doorway.

9

1
PHILOSOPHICAL NEGLECT OF HEIDEGGER’S THINKING ON
EDUCATION

1.1 Philosophical Neglect—The Problem
If we look to the literature of Heidegger scholarship for indication of which
concerns in Heidegger’s philosophical works are important, then we’re likely to conclude
that education (as learning, thinking, teaching, essential preparation for meaningful
human being, as pedagogical program, as movements of transformative passage—all of
which are significant aspects of education for Heidegger) is not one of them. Much has
been written about Heidegger and education in relation to Heidegger’s political actions
and convictions in becoming the first Nazi Rector of Freiburg University but remarkably
little written about education as a significant philosophical concern or theme in
Heidegger’s philosophical work.
Within the extensive philosophical literature on Heidegger’s Rectorship, what
some might count as philosophical consideration of the theme of ‘Heidegger and
education’ is instead consideration of Heidegger’s university administration, especially
the extent of its ethical failings or its leader’s personal philosophical, such as Heidegger’s
support of the Nazi Gleichschaltung (the synchronized control of universities that
dissolved universities’ educative autonomy and freedom). Or, what some might count as
philosophical consideration of ‘Heidegger and education’ is the question of whether
Heidegger’s political involvements in educational administration indicate a ‘fatal flaw’ or
contamination of all of Heidegger’s thought. There’s been little discussion even of the
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educational failings Heidegger’s Rectorship as appropriating specific matters of
education (learning, teaching, program, transformative passage, life preparation) for
ideology, compromising education with politics. And there’s been almost no
philosophical consideration of what I take to be the bona fide matter of the theme
“Heidegger and education”: Heidegger’s philosophy of education, specifically his
thinking on what is proper to education, to its purposes, and to its pedagogy.8
Along with a small body of work by educational theorists and social scientists on
Heidegger’s thinking on education, work which I survey below, there are two important
exceptions to scholarly neglect of Heidegger’s philosophy of education, which I
introduce here and discuss at greater length below. First is Iain Thomson’s Heidegger on
Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (2005), which situates
Heidegger’s willingness to become Nazi Rector of Freiburg in Heidegger’s philosophical
critique of Western metaphysics as ontotheology, in that ontotheology’s erasure of the
ontological grounds of the university’s sciences and their essences, and Heidegger’s
ontological project to re-essentialize the sciences and, therein, unify them by their
common ontological ground. The second exception to the omission of scholarship on
Heidegger’s philosophy of education is Michael Ehrmantraut’s 2001 dissertation in
Political Science, “Heidegger’s Philosophic Pedagogy” (part of which was later
published as Heidegger’s Philosophic Pedagogy (2011)). Ehrmantraut’s study realizes
two important insights for the continuing study of Heidegger’s thinking on education: 1)
Heidegger’s pedagogy is philosophic; and 2) for Heidegger, philosophizing may itself
require of kind of pedagogy.
8

While there has been little philosophical consideration of Heidegger’s thinking on what is proper to
education, to its purposes, and to its pedagogy, there has been, as I’ll further discuss below, more than
a decade of ample work by Australasian educational theorists and social scientists.
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1.2 Philosophical Neglect—Elucidations
The question of why there is remarkably little written about Heidegger’s
philosophy of education is, thus, on the one hand, obviously answered, yet on the other,
that question is more complicated than it might seem. The obvious answer, of course, is
the problem of Heidegger’s Nazism, more specifically the epicenter of Heidegger’s
Nazism at Freiburg University and, then, in the world of education itself. Less obvious,
perhaps, and more complicated have been specific repercussions of Heidegger’s Nazism
in the world of Heidegger scholarship and their impact on favorable consideration of
Heidegger’s thinking on education. These repercussions have brought, and continue to
bring, valid benefits from the ‘academy’ to our understanding of many matters, including
understanding of Heidegger’s involvements and understanding that the light his particular
case sheds on abiding questions about why a ‘modern,’ ‘enlightened,’ ‘occidental’ state
could authorize and author a holocaust.
As beneficial inquiry unfolded, it raised larger, fundamental concerns extending
beyond Heidegger’s particular case. These include significant fundamental questions 1)
about the bearing of a philosopher’s lived life on his works, and his works on his lived
life; 3) about philosophical errancy; 4) about the yoking of education and politics; 5)
about what means and decides ‘greatness’ in a thinker; 6) about a maker’s right to control
organization and reception of works; 6) about identity and difference, how we
understand, identify, and distinguish who we are.
Beneficial too has been gathering and publication of relevant primary materials,
leading to widely shared consensus, even among Heidegger apologists, that Heidegger
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was a willing National Socialist, Nazi, and anti-Semite. Beneficial too has been
substantial, probing inquiry into the extent, understanding, and commitment of
Heidegger’s political involvements, including the widely shared consensus, even among
Heidegger critics, that Heidegger’s anti-Semitism was not the Nazi biological or racial
oppressive kind, a judgment that is understandably significant in the context of the Shoah
and is also a meaningful waymarker for those contending with, or agreeing with, Richard
Wolin’s influential 1991 claim, “now that we know the extent of Heidegger’s
partisanship for the Nazi cause in the early 1930s, we cannot help but read him
differently.”9
Along with the benefits, however, have been difficult, sometimes dismaying, and
distracting repercussions in the academic and journalistic confrontation with the facts and
interpretations of Heidegger’s Nazi involvements and anti-Semitism, repercussions “on
display” again as Thomas Sheehan noted, with sensationalized intensity upon the 2014
publication of three volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe devoted to several of
Heidegger’s Nachlaß Schwarze Hefte, the so-called Black Notebooks.10 What’s
dismaying isn’t critical confrontation of Heidegger’s writing and thought, including
explicit remarks taken as anti-Semitic in the Black Notebooks volumes.11 What’s been
dismaying throughout the academic and journalistic confrontation with the facts and
interpretations of Heidegger’s Nazi involvements and anti-Semitism—and no less so with
9

Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy, vii.
See Thomas Sheehan, “Review: Krzysztof Ziarek, Language After Heidegger.”
11
By way of (my) explanation: The Notebooks contain writings from 1930-1976, writings Heidegger
elsewhere described as setting forth “the basic mental states of questioning and the paths to the most
extreme horizons of all attempts at thinking” (M 376/GA66: 426).11 But the main attention given to the
published Black Notebooks volumes has been to the twelve pages (twelve of 1200+) of the Notebooks
that contain anti-Semitic remarks. These remarks link “world-jewry” causally to the “end of
philosophy,” nihilism’s withdrawal of being, and the capitalist, cosmopolitan plights of our latemodern world. Similar remarks, and notably more numerous, throughout the Notebooks causally link
Americans, the British, Bolsheviks, and Catholics to the same ends and plights.
10
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the publication of the Black Notebooks—has been salacious gossip and pandering for
celebrity recognition (beginning with the exposé hype and shoddy ‘scholarship’ of
Farías’s provocative book). Troubling too has been the confrontation’s careerism, its selfmanufactured scandalmongering, its internecine polemics, and perhaps most especially
its intellectual vigilantism.
This intellectual vigilantism has been directed not only against Heidegger
(arguably legitimately), but also against those pegged as defending or ‘apologizing’ for
Heidegger, and those choosing not to read Heidegger “differently” and within the Nazi
Heidegger schema, and those whose purported apologetic sin is intellectual liberality of
the kind Jacques Derrida called for (and already quoted from in my introduction). A
month after the publication of Farías’s provocative Heidegger and Nazism, Derrida said
publically, “it is important that the discussion remain open” and not to allow interest in
scandal to replace “rigorous and more difficult work” by those who know the facts of
Heidegger’s political involvements, “who condemn unequivocally both Heidegger’s
Nazism and his silence after the war, but who are also seeking to think beyond the
conventional and comfortable schemas, and precisely to understand.”12
Nearly thirty years later, Anthony J. Steinbock recalled the lambasting Derrida,
Foucault, and others attracted for having ‘taken inspiration from that Nazi’ and recalled it
in the context of the Black Notebooks fracas: “the overall point was that the Heideggerwaters were toxic, and if one draws philosophical sustenance from these waters in any
way, then the reader, too, will be poisoned. It is best, then, to avoid any contact lest we
also become contaminated, even against our better selves. It also seemed to be imperative
now to have no truck with any thinkers who had also drunk from those waters, be this
12

See Jacques Derrida, “Heidegger, the Philosopher’s Hell” 181-2.
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thinker a Foucault, a Derrida, a Levinas, or a de Beauvoir.”13 And if the Heidegger waters
in general became toxic, we might extend the metaphor to say those waters were lethal
for any one drawing philosophical sustenance from them by the way of Heidegger’s
philosophy of education, given Heidegger’s. No wonder and obvious is the reason for
philosophical neglect of Heidegger’s thinking on education, given the epicenter of
Heidegger’s Nazism at Freiburg University and, then, in the world of education itself.
There are also less dramatic but nonetheless significant reasons for why
remarkably little written has been about Heidegger’s philosophy of education. Less
dramatic but nonetheless significant, are the general neglect of education as a serious
philosophical concern, the often implicit nature of Heidegger’s philosophical work on
education, and Heidegger’s unsystematic approach.
The neglect of Heidegger’s philosophy of education as a serious concern in
Heidegger’s thought is also consequence of the general contemporary neglect, especially
in the Anglo-American analytic tradition of the last eighty years, of education as a serious
concern in philosophical study. Concern for, thought about, and discussion of education
and pedagogy has mostly been relegated to journalism and its pundits, to social science
research, and to (the remaining) education schools and departments of universities and
their professors, professionals, and practitioners. In these hands, as Heidegger might style
it, meditative thinking on education and pedagogy too often becomes the calculative
thought of education theory and journalism.14 Education becomes systematized business,
13

See Anthony J. Steinbock, “Heidegger, Machination, and the Jewish Question: The Problem of the
Gift,” 50.
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For Heidegger’s well-known discussion of the need for meditative thinking alongside the calculative
thinking of our late-modern age, see “Memorial Address” (DT 43-57/GA16: 517-529). Further, the
calculative thought of educational theory is most concretely and perhaps most ridiculously exemplified
in products like the Journal of Educational Measurement and its offerings, such as “An Odds Ratio
Approach for Assessing Differential Distractor Functioning Effects under the Nominal Response
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educational theory becomes positive science, and education as practice and theory
increasingly fails to realize “an ontologically adequate answer to the question about what
kind of Being” and beings it serves and must cultivate—educate—for the sake of the
future of individual—beings and Being collective (BT75/SZ:50). It increasingly falls
away from philosophical inquiry into and about the essence of education and the culture
and learners it serves. Simply said, in their hands, education increasingly falls away from
thinking.
The failure of those designated by the university structure to be scientists of
education (and our ongoing ‘crisis in education’ confirms the failure of them and their
science) is for the early Heidegger an ontological failure, Thomson’s significant study
Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education, shows. It is a
failure to grasp what kind of Being and beings are served by educational science and its
practice, education. The failure of educational science and practice passes the buck to a
greater failure. The greater failure is the failure of philosophy and philosophers, whose
specialized discipline and training should be for the sake of ontological questioning, so as
to answer adequately the question about what kind of Being and beings is at issue for the
science of education.
The removal of education from philosophy, the distancing of philosophy and
philosophers from education as a matter for their serious concern, and education’s falling
away from thinking, both in its theory and its practice, were already matters of serious
Model” (2008). In the United States, the most pervasive product of education professionals and
practitioners is the American public school system, where calculative thinking systematizes teaching
and learning by reducing teaching to a set of rules and methods and reducing learning to a set of
standards and skill grids. Paul Smeyers, writing on “The Context of Education Nowadays” in “The
Origin: Education, Philosophy, and a Work of Art,” 91, says, “Modernity is instrumentalist. Under
performativity, deliberation over ends is eclipsed and all kinds of business and activity are measured
and ranked against each other with ever less concern for the rationale for doing so.”
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concern in Heidegger’s time. As Thomson argues in Heidegger on Ontotheology, they
were matters of serious concern for Heidegger throughout his entire career of thought and
were the intellectual impetus for his involvement in National Socialism. As Thomson
characterizes Heidegger’s educational concern throughout his entire career of thought,
“Heidegger seeks to effect nothing less than a reontologizing revolution in our
understanding of education.”15 It is terribly ironic, then, that philosophers, whom
Heidegger would argue to be best equipped to offer insight into the essence or being of
education—insight which might guide or serve practical education and its theory—
neglect education as a serious concern in philosophical study. It is additionally ironic, but
predictable, and arguably legitimate, within Heidegger’s own story of the calamity
wrought by the attempt to affect educational and political reality from a philosophical
position, that study of Heidegger’s work would neglect education as a serious concern in
his thought and would, then, not hear and not learn from the call of its teaching.
Finally, the neglect of Heidegger’s philosophy of education as a serious concern
in Heidegger’s thought is also likely a consequence of the subtlety of much of
Heidegger’s thought on education. Heidegger’s thought on education is only occasionally
explicit or direct, and instead implicit or seemingly peripheral in writings and teachings
where other matters appear central. Few of his writings directly consider education or
educational themes philosophically (the Rectoral Address (1933), “Plato's Doctrine of
Truth” (1940), What is Called Thinking? (1952) are exceptions and give evidence to
literalists that education is at least a concern in Heidegger’s thinking, if not a central
concern). His systematics are mytho-poetically expressed, if they do in fact exist—and
may do so only in the structure of ‘fugal’ movements of preparatory vision in
15
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Contributions to Philosophy—or merge with his philosophizing. Heidegger’s disclosing
of the practical details of his educational thought— for example, what is learning and
how to learn, or what marks educational ‘progress’—are esoterically presented to protect
what they call for from ordinary understandings of pedagogical methodology, and require
that they be learned by the very way of learning they teach: an encounter in thinking what
is in them questionworthy and in that thinking, an unfolding to bring near the manifold
meaningful presence they hold.
More often, though, the pedagogical details of Heidegger’s educational thought
are missed altogether, or if noted and merely noted, remain so much at a distance as to be
‘useless.’ Heidegger might tell us that our overlooking the importance of the matters of
education to his philosophical work is yet another indication of our propensity to neglect,
to fall away from, or to set far from us what is near (P 253/GA9: 163).

1.3 Philosophical Neglect—Exceptions from Social Science
Even though academic philosophy has been reluctant or slow to take up seriously
Heidegger’s thinking on education, educational theorists and social scientists working in
university education departments have used Heidegger’s thought to ‘inform educational
thinking and practice’ and have created a literature discussing the application of
‘Heidegger’s ideas’ in educational practice.16 Most of their work concerns ideas from
Being and Time, and especially Being and Time read in terms of existentialist or ontoexistentialist schema. Their thematics include being-in-the-world of the classroom first
and ‘life’ later, being-human, self-transformation, and especially authenticity and
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technology.17 The work on technology shows a greater understanding of Heidegger’s
technology project, especially its aim to call technology and calculative thinking into
question and to view technology as that which empties human being of being. The
majority of this theoretical and practical work concerning authenticity and technology has
been done in Australia and New Zealand.18
The best of this work (I survey two examples here) is more philosophical in its
grappling with Heidegger’s thought than it is practical in educational application; the best
of this work’s practical considerations appropriate Heidegger’s thought instead of
applying it as a tool ready to hand.19 However, little of this work penetrates the surfaces
of Heidegger’s thinking on education, and in its apparent innocence or ignoring of
Heidegger’s political involvements, it further seems to lack circumspection about the
philosophical ‘gold’ they mine and mind eagerly. Neverthless, their recognizing that
Heidegger’s philosophy includes thinking on pedagogy and the general aims of education
does confirm that Heidegger’s thought is indeed enough about education to draw
consideration from educational thinkers and practitioners. A review of this work is useful
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For a good example, see Michael Bonnett. “Education as a Form of the Poetic,” 229-244.
The worst of it bowdlerizes Heidegger’s thinking, misunderstanding and agonizing it as Nietzsche’s
“God is dead” has been misunderstood and agonized, and while it is exciting to see Heidegger reaching
beyond philosophy departments, Heidegger probably would have been uneasy with the project
developers who twice found “Heidegger’s thinking…useful,” once when they “had to consider
carefully the nature/characteristics of the students and they came to call them ‘Heidegger’s Greeks.’”
(See Robert Shaw, Towards a Heideggerian Pedagogy.”) These ‘Heidegger’s Greeks’ were Maori
students, whom Shaw characterized “the strugglers in schools, perhaps easily distracted from their
work, … in schools bombarded with images and movement, distracted easily by this movement, and
distracted by their friends.” The remove of social science’s application of bowdlerized Heidegger
thinking from Heidegger’s thinking in full and in truth is not always so ridiculously great, but I offer it
as reason for my not including more of social science’s literature on Heidegger’s educational ideas in
my review of the literature available, and as support for my claim that serious understanding of
‘Heideggerian pedagogy’ has been, with very few exceptions, neglected.
19
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here for its speaking a survey of introductory ideas and scholarly interpretation of
Heidegger’s thinking on education that are relevant to my study.
As scholar and as founding editor of Educational Philosophy and Theory,
Michael Peters has more steadily than anyone else to date supported the best of the
philosophical and practical literature on Heidegger’s educational philosophy and
continued to argue for serious philosophical consideration of Heidegger as an educational
thinker. In Peters’ editorial introducing a special issue of Educational Philosophy and
Theory devoted to Phenomenology and Education (41:9 February 2009), he echoes many
of the views I’ve introduced here and aim to develop in my dissertation project. Peters
attributes the “little… written on Heidegger or about his work and its significance for
educational thought and practice” to the complexity of Heidegger’s work and its
neologisms, Carnap’s attack on Heidegger’s metaphysics that discredited Heidegger
among analytic philosophers, and Heidegger’s association with Nazism.20 Peters believes
“a convincing argument can be made for the centrality of his philosophy to education
including Heidegger’s critique of the ontotheological tradition… together with his
overriding concern for the question of the meaning of Being,” for “no philosopher since
Socrates, was so committed to questions of education and to good teaching as
Heidegger.”21 “Many of his texts,” Peters says, “especially those works that come to us as
lectures he gave to specific audiences, are specifically and self-consciously
pedagogical.”22 And, finally, what could serve as one of the premises of my dissertation
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project: “education for Heidegger constitutes a passage into thought that involves our
entire being.”23
In David Cooper’s “Truth, Science, Thinking, and Distress,” Cooper rightly
reminds us that we should not only look for Heidegger’s educational thinking in the
remarks Heidegger’s made explicitly on education (such as those in What is Called
Thinking?), but also look to Contributions to Philosophy and to Heidegger’s thinking on
Wissenschaft, which “occupied Heidegger over forty or more years.”24 Cooper explicates
Heidegger’s prediction that “universities will become [quoting Heidegger] ‘merely
operational institutions’ and ‘sites for scientific research and teaching’” by relating
Heidegger’s prediction to Heidegger’s critique of technology and to Heidegger’s long
developed discussion of truth, including Heidegger’s view of the centrality of truth to the
essence of Wissenschaft and, most importantly, Heidegger’s view that the essence of truth
had changed in its shift from truth as disclosure or unhiddenness/unconcealedness to truth
as correspondence.25 This shift means for Heidegger, as Cooper reads Heidegger in the
Contributions to Philosophy, that “with truth conceived as a fixed relation between
entities, assertions, and their objects, humans lose all sense of themselves as being
essentially engaged with the emergence of truth, in a process, that calls for ‘deep awe,’
whereby things emerge out of hiddenness into the light.”26 Following Heidegger, Cooper
says that humans live lives bombarded by objects, are themselves viewed as objects, and
are “palpably bereft of the deep awe and wonder that obtain when there is mindfulness of
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truth.”27 This shift in truth, mindfulness, and awe, as Cooper recounts Heidegger’s view
from “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” “underlies the mutation of paideia as a ‘passage’ from
one condition to another into ‘schooling’ as the ‘calculated, swift, massive distribution of
understood information to as many as possible in the shortest possible time.’”28

1.4 Philosophical Neglect—Exceptions from Philosophy Thomson, Ehrmantraut,
and Derrida
As forecasted above, there are two important exceptions to philosophical
scholarly neglect of Heidegger’s philosophy of education: Iain Thomson’s Heidegger on
Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (2005) and Michael
Ehrmantraut’s 2001 dissertation in Political Science, “Heidegger’s Philosophic
Pedagogy.”
Thomson
Iain Thomson’s Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of
Education is significant—first, because it is a first: it is the first published work of
philosophical scholarship devoted extensively to Heidegger’s philosophy of education,
establishing the study of Heidegger’s philosophy of education on serious philosophical
grounds, and leaving open questions for further serious study.29 Second, it shows that
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Telepresence and the Remoteness of the Real,” both collected in Hubert Dreyfus, On the Internet; as
well as Dreyfus’s successful ‘experiment’ with the then new iTunes U in 2007, the podcasting of
several of Dreyfus’ lecture courses at Berkeley (including two of his Heidegger courses), and
Dreyfus’s reaching and ‘teaching’ a global, mass learning audience. Dreyfus’s podcasting ‘experiment’
and its pedagogical example surely supports Dreyfus’s exploration of the Heideggerian concern of
what might be appropriate ways to implement technology without giving ourselves over to it (for
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Heidegger’s commitment to education as ontological education extends beyond his 1933
Rectorship in its argument that later work, such as “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” (1940) and
What is Called Thinking? (1951-2) speak Heidegger’s mature educational philosophy.
Third, it offers a way of thinking about the Heidegger controversy and a way of
approaching its problems, particularly the question of how a philosopher could participate
in a political practice so egregious as National Socialism, and whether or not Heidegger’s
political mistake “disqualifies,” as Richard Wolin conveys it, Heidegger’s philosophy
altogether.30 And, finally, in its discussion of Heidegger’s philosophical shift from
fundamental ontology to an understanding of metaphysics as ontotheology, and situating
Heidegger’s educational thinking in that shift, Thomson gives us philosophical reasons to
take Heidegger seriously as a philosopher of education and to learn from his teaching,
when we might otherwise have held that Heidegger’s decision to appropriate his
philosophical thinking on education in service to National Socialism disqualifies him.
Thomson argues that Heidegger’s decision to join National Socialism and become
the first Nazi Rector of Freiburg was based on a philosophical mistake, on Heidegger’s
early view that there was “a substantive fundamental ontology waiting beneath history to
be discovered” and enacted in the university from the top down under Heidegger’s

Heidegger, shortening university to “U” signaled further decay of the university—see WCT 34-5/GA8:
37). However, Dreyfus’s work on Heidegger and education more responds philosophically to the
practical implications for education of Heidegger’s later work (and teaching) on Bestand and
technology, as the titles of Dreyfus’s papers indicate, than it addresses Heidegger’s philosophical
thinking for, and guidance of, education in its essence (leading human being to the place of its essential
being and accustoming human being to it). Nevertheless, Dreyfus’s work on technology and education
is grounded in his regard for Heidegger as a serious thinker and teacher about educational matters, and
grounded in Dreyfus’s teaching of this regard, as Thomson gratefully acknowledges (see Thomson,
Heidegger on Ontotheology, x-xi, 179).
It should be noted that Michael Ehrmantraut’s Heidegger’s Philosophic Pedagogy, written in 2001
as his Ph.D. dissertation (published in 2011), which I address below, does not include reference to
Thomson’s work, nor does Ehrmantraut indicate awareness of it.
30
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leadership as university Rector. Heidegger’s aim as philosopher-dean to the departmental
faculty as guardians was what Thomson terms a “reontologization” of a university
fragmented by the separation and specialization of the various academic departments.
This reontologization was to be accomplished through the “mutual recognition that…the
community is committed to the same formal pursuit,” not merely understanding what is,
but investigating the ontological presuppositions guiding the various fields of knowledge,
and “forming excellent individuals, where ‘excellence’ is…a kind of ontological
perfectionism in which students learn to develop their distinctive capacity for worlddisclosing as they participate in the advancement of science by learning to question the
science’s guiding ontological presuppositions.”31 The singularity, the solidarity, and the
existential perfectionism of this vision have their ground in fundamental ontology, the
faith in the successful recovery of which was, Thomson claims, Heidegger’s
philosophical mistake.
Thomson’s analysis is not meant to excuse Heidegger’s political misdeeds or
dismiss with ‘he made a mistake,’ as with the wave of a hand, the seriousness of his
misdeeds, but to explain and understand them on philosophical ground. Thomson’s
analysis addresses some of the persistent questions of the Heidegger controversy with
precise reasons realized through philosophical analysis so as to understand how
Heidegger the philosopher and the man—and the teacher—could act as he did.
Furthermore, Thomson argues that Heidegger, having seen his project for education go so
egregiously wrong in 1933 because of his philosophy of fundamental ontology, abandons
fundamental ontology for a philosophy of historically sequenced ontotheologies. This
philosophy of historically sequenced ontotheologies forms the basis for Heidegger’s
31
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critique of technology and Heidegger’s more mature vision of education as that which
turns us toward overcoming our age’s reigning ontotheology.
Thomson’s work is groundbreaking for Heidegger study because it makes it
possible for us to set the issues of the Heidegger controversy in the background (it is
probable that they will never be left behind entirely), and it sets in the foreground
Heidegger’s philosophy of education as a matter for serious study apart from the
Heidegger controversy and as central to Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole. In doing so,
Thomson sets before us theses that are important to serious philosophical study of
Heidegger on education, some of which Thomson develops and others of which remain
undeveloped and preliminary, but initiated and opened up nonetheless.
Implicit in Thomson’s developed thesis that Heidegger abandons fundamental
ontology for a philosophy of historically sequenced ontotheologies, and in doing so seeks
to correct and refine his failed reontologizing revolution in our understanding of
education, is the idea, wanting further study, that education, being, and truth are
interdependent and central to Heidegger’s thought. I aim for this idea to be one of the
theses and guiding principles of my dissertation project. In Heidegger on Ontotheology
Thomson offers the term “ontological education” to name or characterize Heidegger’s
philosophy of education and Heidegger’s project for education.32 In that term is an
expressed correlation of being and education and logos, or account, implying language,
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and the means by which truth as aletheia is humanly represented. Thomson offers that
ontological education is what Heidegger in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” takes to be the
essence of paideia: this education “lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its
entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to
it.” Ontological education, as Thomson elucidates it, accustoms us to our “distinctive
capacity for world-disclosing” and teaches us to “‘to disclose the essential in all
things.’”33
Heidegger mentions in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” having developed it more
fully in The Essence of Truth, that the allegory of the cave in Plato’s Republic, “not only
illustrates the essence of education but also, and at the same time, opens our eyes to a
transformation in the essence of ‘truth.’ If the ‘allegory’ can show both [the essence of
education and a transformation in the essence of truth], must it not be the case that an
essential relation holds between ‘education’ and ‘truth’? This relation does, in fact,
obtain. And it consists in the fact that the essence of truth and the sort of transformation is
undergoes here first make possible ‘education’ in its basic structures (P167/GA9:218).
This essential relation between education and truth, and their relation to being, is
the fruit, and its development is the focus, of Heidegger’s early educational thought from
his earliest writings, through Being and Time, to the writings of the early 1930’s,
including “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” and The Essence of Truth. His insight, that this
relation between education and truth is essential, holds through his shifts from
metaphysics as fundamental ontology to metaphysics as epochs of ontotheologies,
although his understanding of truth shifts in this time, as does the education and research
that relates to it. What, perhaps, does not shift is Heidegger’s understanding of the Frage,
33
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the question, and its role in relating truth to education as research and as learning. The
essential relation among education and truth and being, and Heidegger’s understanding of
the Frage and inquiry in that relation, will guide my study and search for Heidegger’s
work on education before and including Being and Time.
Implicit in what Thomson calls an “interpretive thesis” for Heidegger on
Ontotheology—that education is a theme through Heidegger’s entire career and a radical
rethinking of education is one of the deep thematic undercurrents of Heidegger’s entire
career of thought—is the claim that “we should expect to find some sign of Heidegger’s
supposed lifelong concern with education” in Heidegger’s work before and after his
failed reontologizing revolution at Freiburg in 1933.34 This claim opens into questions of
whether or not these signs are present throughout Heidegger’s entire career of thought,
beyond the signs Thomson explains and identifies in Heidegger’s work before 1933, in
the work of the Rectoral period, in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” and in What is Called
Thinking?35 Implicit in this same claim that a radical rethinking of education is one of the
deep thematic undercurrents of Heidegger’s entire career of thought are questions about
whether Heidegger remained committed to the renewal of the university, whether he
remained committed to the same project or vision for renewal of the university, and if
committed to a different or refined vision, what is that vision?
Thomson shows that Heidegger’s initial aim for ontological education was that it
reunify the university by “shattering the encapsulation of the sciences in their different
disciplines” and restore “substance to the notion of excellence,” “where excellence is
understood in terms of a kind of ontological perfectionism, in which students learn to
34
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develop their distinctive capacity for world-disclosing as they participate in the
advancement of science by learning to question the sciences’ guiding ontological
presuppositions.”36 Thomson’s view of Heidegger’s mature aim for ontological education
is that it teach students 1) about the ontological posits of the disciplines in which they
study and major; 2) that these ontological posits “stem from the particular historical
ontotheology that implicitly guides our age”; 3) to “recognize, contest, and transcend”
this ontotheology.37
Acknowledging that Heidegger on Ontotheology’s concentration on Heidegger’s
later works may leave unanswered the question of whether or not we do “find some sign
of Heidegger’s supposed lifelong concern with education” in his “magnum opus” Being
and Time, Thomson’s 2005 paper, “Heidegger’s Perfectionist Philosophy of Education In
Being and Time,” takes up this question, finding that though not explicitly present,
Heidegger’s concern with education is subtly present.38 Thomson explores this presence
in terms of Being and Time’s perfectionist themes of authenticity, authentic beingtogether, and Heidegger’s exhortation “Become what you are!” Thomson finds “Being
and Time’s primary pedagogical insight…[to be] the distinction between a ‘leaping
ahead’ which ‘liberates’ and a ‘leaping in’ which ‘dominates’ (BT 158-9/SZ: 122)], a
distinction which for Heidegger maps onto the difference between authentic and
inauthentic methods of pedagogical ‘being-together’ (Mitsein).”39 Thomson wonders,
“what the early Heidegger thought teachers might do directly – as well as how far he
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though they should go indirectly – to help students achieve authenticity.”40 Michael
Ehrmantraut’s Heidegger’s Philosophic Pedagogy (2011) takes up this very issue.

Ehrmantraut
Given how little scholarship there is on Heidegger and his philosophy of
education, it is encouraging that two scholars, Thomson and Ehrmantraut, unknown to
one another until recently, produce work on Heidegger’s philosophy of education that is
so strong, so complementary, and so foundational for this overlooked area of Heidegger
studies. Many of the insights Thomson offers in “Heidegger’s Perfectionist Philosophy of
Education In Being and Time” are also offered and developed in substantial detail in
Ehrmantraut’s study. Ehrmantraut’s thesis is “that philosophy is, for Heidegger,
pedagogical in the widest and deepest sense of the word” and “may itself require of kind
of ‘pedagogy’”; and that, because philosophizing happens only in human being (Dasein),
whose pre-philosophic tendencies hinder philosophic questioning, philosophizing “needs
its own liberation and guidance.”41
Ehrmantraut concentrates his study on the early Heidegger and on the lecture
courses from the years 1927-35, especially the yet untranslated Einleitung in die
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Philosophie (Introduction to Philosophy) (1928/9), The Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics (1929/30), and to a lesser extent Introduction to Metaphysics (1935),
arguing that after Being and Time, which is not methodologically suited to philosophic
pedagogy, Heidegger adopted “a new pedagogy,” “the university lecture as the primary
way in which philosophic inquiry is communicated.”42 Being and Time is not
methodologically suited to philosophic pedagogy because “the guidance given by the
[formal indicative] ontological interpretation is…indirect” and Being and Time cannot
discuss how “Dasein in each case factically resolves itself,” but philosophic pedagogy, as
Ehrmantraut presents it, is grounded in its ontological interpretation and implicit
exhortations.43
The need for philosophic pedagogy arises from the need presented in Being and
Time, that Being (Sein) “while universally ‘understood’…always eludes one’s ability to
comprehend it.”44 That is, an understanding of Being is essential and universal to human
being, it is an understanding that enables human being to relate to the world, its things,
and its beings, and because this understanding permeates and conditions man’s everyday
interaction in the world, it goes unquestioned and is understood implicitly but not
comprehended explicitly. Philosophizing is a way to comprehend explicitly what is
merely implicitly understood. Philosophizing is a way to comprehend that understanding
of Being and beings is more complicated and more meaningful, holding and concealing
more possibilities for meaning, significance, and practice, than human being everyday
understanding holds. Heidegger’s Being eludes universal understanding, resists the fetters
of universal understanding, so as to keep questions open, to keep open and ongoing the
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question of Being particularly. Philosophy itself, for Heidegger, purports universal
understandings that fail to comprehend or question fully or even adequately the
possibilities and need for meaning, significance, and practice in an understanding of
Being and being. Understanding of Being is analogous to education, or to the aim of
philosophic pedagogy, inasmuch as education, as Ehrmantraut characterizes it, is “a
process of disclosure [that] transforms what is ‘already’ disclosed, but every new
disclosure is imbued with its own mode of hiddenness.”45 The need for the practice of
philosophic pedagogy, then, emerges as if from Hamlet’s exhortation to Horatio: “there
are more things in heaven and earth, Horation,/ Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”46
Philosophic pedagogy happens for Heidegger, Ehrmantraut says, primarily
through the lecture.47 It is Ehrmantraut’s view that Heidegger “takes advantage of the
constraints imposed by his academic position as a teacher— for example, the official duty
to deliver lectures and to ‘introduce’ beginning students to academic subjects though such
lectures—in order to execute his deepest philosophical intentions.”48 One of Heidegger’s
deepest philosophical intentions is to liberate the individual student and, through him the
Volk and the West.49 This liberation of human being that emerges through students, the
Volk, and the West, is a complicated notion in Heidegger’s thought. During the Rectoral
period, Heidegger aims for his philosophic pedagogy to make lecture students aware of
their duty to awaken philosophically to the possibilities of Being and human being and to
lead other students and other Germans to do the same. The awakening first of students
and then the German people is an awakening of the Volk as grass roots populace, spirit,
45
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and source for authentic being that may renew the decadent West and revitalize the West
as historical community. Explicit in Heidegger’s thought during the Rectoral period
especially is that this Volk is specifically German. The philosophical awakening of
students and of the German Volk is meant to give to Germany the task of leading all of
the West toward awakening and renewal. This awakening and leadership is, for
Heidegger, a German destiny, a collective happening to be seized and enacted. It is
Heidegger’s belief, especially and explicitly during the Rectoral period, that the
realization of this destiny could begin in university students and spread beyond to the
Volk and to the West.
Heidegger’s deepest philosophical intentions, then, are pedagogical, argues
Ehrmantraut, for Heidegger sees this liberation happening first in students through
awareness of their historical situation, both as western Germans and as teachers and
learners together at the university, and through the awakening of philosophical
attunement and philosophizing in them. These lectures repeatedly ask, “what is
philosophy?” and so, argues Ehrmantraut, they cultivate and guide students toward the
“pre-understanding of philosophy” that in “compelling them to what Heidegger calls their
“inner task,” attunes, awakens, and liberates them.50 This liberation is what Thomson
calls the “work of philosophical education… a kind of self-recovery…won by
recognizing, confronting, and overcoming a pre-existing source of resistance, [which is]
in Being and Time … the inertial undertow of das Man…[and] in the later work …
comes, ultimately, from the unnoticed effects exercised on us by a set of historically
specific metaphysical or, more precisely, ontotheological presuppositions.”51
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Ehrmantraut’s study does not look beyond Heidegger’s early philosophy of
education and Heidegger’s early pedagogical aim in the 1927-34 lectures to guide
students to liberation from das Man. The aim of Heidegger’s philosophic pedagogy, as
Ehrmantraut reads it, is liberation and guidance, and its task is to make philosophic
questioning possible for others. The problem of this philosophic pedagogy is what
Ehrmantraut, citing Heidegger, calls “the problem of beginning,” and the main of
Ehrmantraut’s study is devoted to this problem and how introducing philosophic
questioning to others implies philosophic leadership.52 As Ehrmantraut formulates it, this
problem of the beginning includes how to bring students into participating in philosophic
inquiry, how to begin the questioning of Being, how to begin to seize the possibility for
philosophizing when merely reading the ontological interpretation alone in Being and
Time is not enough, and how to convey that “academic study carries with it a certain
communal obligation to exercise…leadership grounded in the fact that philosophy
involves a privileged understanding of the whole of human possibilities.”53 There is, then,
in the aim, task, and problem of philosophic pedagogy as Ehrmantraut interprets it,
moral-political significance and awakening to this significance is part of what
Ehrmantraut takes to be Heidegger’s deepest philosophical intentions.
Ehrmantraut explicates Heidegger’s Einleitung in die Philosophie (1928/29) to
find Heidegger’s method for directly and indirectly awakening students. Ehrmantraut
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says Heidegger presupposes a capacity for “living philosophizing” and giving evidence
that shows that Heidegger’s lecture course Einleitung in die Philosophie involves direct
“exhortatory appeal” to students to awaken to the crisis in science and the collapse of
Bildung, a collapse he presumes they can recognize and feel in their own dissatisfaction
with their academic education, in “the fragmentation of the sciences [which] is at once a
fragmentation of reality.”54 Heidegger’s lecture mode exhorts them to self-reflexivity, so
as to realize the need for ‘living philosophizing’ and to pursue through it the possibility
of restoring reality to their lives. A lecturer’s exhortation, Ehrmantraut says, is not wholly
authoritative because it involves ambiguity: a student cannot know if the teacher speaks
truly or if the student as really understood him; “philosophic pedagogy is inherently ‘nonauthoritative’ in that, strictly speaking it does not prescribe possibilities of thought or
action, nor does it involve transfer of knowledge.”55 Philosophic pedagogy essentially
involves ambiguity and its risk, as does philosophy itself, and experiencing ambiguity as
a source of distress is essential, as Ehrmantraut quotes Heidegger, “in all philosophical
conceiving” and attunement.56 It involves calling students to let themselves, as
Ehrmantraut quotes Heidegger, “be beset by the unknown.”57 Philosophic pedagogy,
Ehrmantraut concludes, does not end like Bildung (education, edification, spiritual
formation) in the “state of completion of existence and knowledge, but rather involves a
constantly renewed and deepened understanding of the ‘untruth’ and concealment that
belongs together with the truth of human existence and the truth of Being.”58
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In addition to exhortation, Heidegger’s lecture method involves “discursive
communication…not as the transference of opinions from the interiority of one subject to
another, but as the explication of possibilities of Dasein’s being-with-one-another in the
world.”59 One outcome of the discursive communication mode of the lecture and its
philosophic pedagogy is boredom, which Heidegger interprets in The Fundamental
Concepts of Metaphysics and uses to awaken in students the experience and attunement
of “being-left-empty,” which leads to an awareness of the problem of the whole, of
world, and leads to the compulsion to take over their own Dasein.60 As Ehrmantraut
observes rightly, Heidegger understands that ambiguity, boredom, and the fundamental
attunement to philosophize cannot be objectified or summoned by will by teachers and
teaching. Awakening cannot involve a demand to transform one’s self or produce and
attunement. Neither discursive communication nor exhortation can instigate the
attunement to philosophize. It cannot transform, but the lecture, Ehrmantraut concludes
of Heidegger’s lecture pedagogy, can “prepare” students for living philosophizing,
bringing them to the brink of its possibility and, then, to the “’leadership’ in the whole of
historical-being-with-one-another.”61 This leadership, Ehrmantraut argues, prepares the
restoration of Bodenstaendigkeit, indigenousness or rootedness, that is undermined by
Das Man and what Heidegger will later call enframing, and the liberation to a historical
community awakened to “a sense for Being in the world as a whole, out of which
philosophic questioning can begin.”62 This leadership and liberation to such a community
is the purpose, Ehrmantraut argues, of Heidegger’s philosophic pedagogy. The
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community is for Heidegger, “a successively more comprehensive historical whole,”
moving from the lecture’s group of students to the Volk to the West.63
In an epilogue, Ehrmantraut recognizes that his discussion of “Heidegger’s
pedagogy remains incomplete.”64 A more complete treatment “would require extensive
attention to Heidegger’s interpretation of poetry” and “special attention to… ‘Plato's
Doctrine of Truth’…and the theme of paideia,” which Ehrmantraut appears to distinguish
from Heidegger’s philosophic pedagogy, though he does not elaborate.65 The distinction
indicates to me, though, that Ehrmantraut sees Heidegger’s philosophic pedagogy
develop toward paideia as a more mature philosophical position (and paideia as
Heidegger appropriates the meaning of the Greek idea), with which I agree. I might
elaborate further that the later Heidegger would find “philosophic pedagogy” a
problematic, if not oxymoronic, term, inasmuch as pedagogy usually indicates a method
for transmission of an academic subject or concepts and it is Heidegger’s view that
philosophy and the ‘philosophic’ in their authentic senses are not subjects, not academic
subjects, not transmittable as such, and not teachable as are the sciences and “fixed
disciplines” of universities in the general sense (FCM 1/GA 29-30:1).
In considering the possibility that Heidegger brought his philosophic pedagogy to
the Rectorship, Ehrmantraut identifies possible false assumptions that led to the
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Rectorship’s failure, namely 1) the assumption that philosophy belongs to the essence of
man, 2) that a student bears within him openness to Being and is receptive to it, and 3)
that a human community can be founded on philosophic questioning. While I take these
assumptions themselves as Ehrmantraut has formulated them to be true of Heidegger’s
philosophy of education, true for Heidegger throughout his lifelong concern with
education, only the third—that a human community can be founded on philosophic
questioning—seems a likely direct factor in the failure of Heidegger’s Rectorship, as
Thomson’s elucidation in Heidegger on Ontotheology of Heidegger’s project to restore
philosophy as the ontological queen of the ontic sciences would confirm.66
Finally, Ehrmantraut suggests, “even after his withdrawal from the Rectorate,
Heidegger continued to maintain that there was an inner relation between philosophic
inquiry and teaching…. Thus even where Heidegger falls short of the more far-reaching
pedagogical aims, the clarity that results precisely from such a ‘failure’ may constitute a
necessary step ‘towards’ the question of Being.” 67 I take both insights here to be right
and important to my study on several points: 1) that there is, for Heidegger, an inner
relation between philosophic inquiry and teaching, 2) that this relation continues after the
Rectorship, 3) that failure or error in Heidegger’s pedagogical project may clarify the
more proper way toward what Heidegger calls “real education.”
It seems clear to me that philosophic pedagogy was merely a beginning for
Heidegger, a problematic beginning, in approaching pedagogically the question of Being
and teaching the living of that question philosophically.68
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Derrida
Although I have said above that Thomson’s work offers us the first extended
scholarly philosophical study of Heidegger’s philosophy of education, Jacques Derrida’s
work also offers a first: the first, and also, truly, the only profoundly rich and extended
philosophical response to Heidegger’s philosophy of education. Derrida engaged in a
lifelong consideration of education, spurred, arguably, by his lifelong engagement with
Heidegger, Heidegger’s teaching, and his own teaching. It could even be said that Derrida
thinks Heidegger’s educational unthought, and that in Derrida’s Greph project and his
cofounding of the International College of Philosophy, Derrida succeeds where
Heidegger failed in realizing his educational philosophy in educational and political
practice.69 Derrida is a great reader and thinker of Heidegger’s educational thought. It is
possible (though speculative) that Derrida’s practical involvements in education were at
least responses to his engagement with Heidegger, specifically his engagement with
Heidegger’s radical rethinking of education, Heidegger’s failure at practical, political,
educational leadership, and the questions of whether Heidegger remained committed to
into question both my argument and Thomson’s that Heidegger’s philosophy of education develops
and matures throughout his lifetime. It may be, though, that Ehrmantraut and these other
Heideggerians anachronistically impose some of Heidegger’s later formulations onto the explications
and interpretations he gives of Heidegger’s earlier work and his account of Heidegger’s philosophic
pedagogy. Or, it may be that these themes identified and attributed to Heidegger’s earlier work on
education that also appear in Heidegger’s later work on education are not in their earlier formulations
as developed or layered as they become in Heidegger’s more mature work, but are “construction sites”
along the way. This seems true of Ereignis, among others. And as Heidegger said pointedly and
repeatedly through the mouthpiece of the Fragenden in “A Dialogue on Language: between a Japanese
and an Inquirer,” which I take to be a most mature instantiation of his educational philosophy
particularly, “as you begin, so you will remain” (Herkunft aber bleibt stets Zukunft); i.e. that which has
come remains to-come, and that which arrived at the origin or inception still calls us ahead toward and
into it. Ideas from early work such as Being and Time circle around questions and problems that were
in its background but later come into in the foreground of his thought, their relationships and
proportions of influence and significance still unclear to him (OWL 6-7/GA12: 91-2)
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the renewal of education and the university, and, if so, whether Heidegger remained
committed to the same vision for renewal.
Derrida’s understanding of Heidegger’s thinking on education is deeply
considered and to my eye, right, though Derrida’s own vision for the university and
education, if we may judge from Derrida’s educational writings and practical projects,
misses some of the subtle necessities of Heidegger’s mature understanding of ontological
education and its practice. Nevertheless, Derrida’s understanding of Heidegger as
philosopher and practitioner of education is profound and a true philosopher’s, inasmuch
as Derrida comes to an understanding of Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism
that allows him to reckon with Heidegger the ontological educator and thinker as nearly
no one else has.
In Derrida’s lecture Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, Derrida, like most
reviewers of educational themes in Heidegger’s work, takes up involvement with
National Socialism, specifically the question of Heidegger’s stand before Spirit (Geist,
l’esprit) in his involvement with National Socialism. However, unlike most, Derrida
stands open before the question beyond whatever political angers he might bring to it,
willing to heed the “the call or the guarding of the question” in order to approach “what is
highest and best in thought.”70 Derrida is able to remain open to Heidegger as educator
and as educational philosopher. He accepts, without validating, Heidegger’s decision to
become Nazi Rector, such that Derrida can say in “Mochlos, or the Conflict of the
Faculties” that Heidegger’s much maligned Rectoral Address is “the last great discourse
in which the Western university tries to think its essence and its destination in terms of
responsibility, with a stable reference to the same idea of knowledge, technics, the State,
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and the nation, very close to a limit at which the memorial gathering of a thinking makes
a sudden sign toward the entirely-other of a very terrifying future.”71
As Thomson reminds us in Chapter 3 of Heidegger on Ontotheology, that after
Derrida’s statement in “Mochlos” on Heidegger’s Rectoral Address, Derrida gives his
view on whether or not, after Heidegger’s failed Rectorship and involvement with
National Socialism, Heidegger remained committed to the renewal of the university and
whether or not he remained committed to the same or a different vision for the university
and/or education. Derrida writes,
after this speech…the enclosure of the university—as a commonplace and
powerful contract with the state, with the public, with knowledge, with
metaphysics and technics—will seem to him less and less capable of
measuring up to a more essential responsibility, that responsibility that,
before having to answer for a knowledge, power, or something or other
determinate, before having to answer to a being or determinate object
before a determinate subject, must first answer to being, for the call of
being, and must think this coresponsibility. But, once again, essential as it
may seem to me, I cannot explore this path today.72
Thomson counters that Derrida here “exaggerates Heidegger’s break with the
university,” for it is Thomson’s view that Heidegger’s commitment to ressentializing the
notion of excellence in education continues throughout Heidegger’s career of thought.73
In Chapters 3 and 4 of Heidegger on Ontotheology, Thomson refines the views of
Derrida and Otto Pöggeler on the questions of whether or not Heidegger remained
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committed to the renewal of the university and, if Heidegger did, whether he remained
committed to the same project or vision for renewal of the university. Thomson writes
that Heidegger did not “give up trying to transform education in general—and, thus, by
implication, university education as well,” and that “the later Heidegger ceaselessly seeks
to expand the parameters of the ontological education he sought to install at the heart of
the university, thereby working to broaden the educational situation beyond the
boundaries of the university.”74 Thomson associates this commitment of Heidegger’s
with university education particularly. While I agree that Heidegger’s commitment to
ressentializing education does continue, I am more likely to side with Derrida’s view that
the university seemed to Heidegger less and less capable of answering the call of being in
education, that it seemed less and less capable of ontological education.
This does not mean that Heidegger abandoned hope for the renewal of the
university, but that his vision for education may have required places and spaces and an
ethos other than those possible in the modern university’s structure. Derrida’s own work
in education intends to make space for a particular kind of philosophical place, and it
intends to transform the rights and responsibilities of the university, its constituents, and
its projects, mitigating, if not ending, the university’s particular mode of violence.
Derrida’s project for education is a deconstructive project, aiming, as Derrida believes
deconstruction can, to open the university, teaching, and philosophy “to its own future.”75
Our responsibility in philosophizing—our responsibility in the space that is the
university—is to keep open the place where the interchangeability and instability and
incompleteness of names, logos, and myths can be read and realized, deconstructed and
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renewed. Derrida aims, by his educational project and leadership, to avoid particularly
the violence—the human violation—of Heidegger’s political allegiances and leadership
in his educational project at Freiburg. Derrida aims also, it seems, to avoid the academic
violence suggested by Plato’s educational project of the Republic’s city in speech—the
lie, however noble, that speeches can give complete account of, or even realize, that
political and educational center that is, seemingly, Plato’s Republic.
While a similar political language, purpose, and position characterizes the
Heidegger of the Rectoral period, after the 1934 lecture course Logic as the Question
Concerning the Essence of Language (GA38) and Heidegger’s notorious remark in
Introduction to Metaphysics (see footnote), Heidegger is carefully less publically political
or is even apolitical in his writings and his taken position in them.76 His most political
writing of the post-1935 period is likely Contributions to Philosophy, inasmuch as its
language and images reflect the Nazi rhetoric and reality happening as Heidegger wrote
Contributions to Philosophy and are, arguably, an element of Heidegger’s confrontation
with and critique of that reality. Contributions to Philosophy shows Heidegger at his most
pessimistic about the future of the university. Heidegger stipulated that Contributions to
Philosophy not be seen publically or published until all the lecture courses of the ‘second’
division of his Gesamtausgabe had been published, effectively removing its political,
educational, and philosophical purport from public and political life. (Heidegger
considered the thought of those courses to be prerequisite for understanding the way of
76
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thought that he ventured ontology, beginning in 1936. His stipulation was respected until
1989, when the managers of the publication of his Gesamtausgabe decided to publish
Contributions to Philosophy, even though all the lecture course texts were not yet
published. Heidegger’s removal from active political life at Freiburg or elsewhere after
1934 probably contributes to Derrida’s sense that Heidegger broke from the university,
because for Derrida the university, its discourses, and its activities are for political (often
Marxist) strivings and revolutions.
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2
PAIDEIA AND APAIDEIA IN “PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH”
The fact that Plato reaches for a simile (Gleichnis) when he comes to the extreme
boundary of philosophy, the beginning and end of philosophy, is no accident. And the
content of the simile especially, is not accidental…. We must relinquish the idea of
interpreting in all its dimensions this inexhaustible simile.
—Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology

2.1 “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”: Introduction
In several works written during the span of Heidegger’s tumultuous and
transitional middle period (1929-1940), Heidegger takes up the Cave Allegory of Plato’s
Republic, revisiting it to work and think there as if the allegory is a lodestone, perhaps
even a pivot in Heidegger’s turnings of thought, during the 1930s. Though Heidegger
refers to Plato’s Cave Allegory in a couple of earlier lectures (notably the 1927 Marburg
lecture series Basic Problems of Phenomenology), Heidegger’s deep exploration of the
“explanatory power” of the Cave Allegory begins with Heidegger’s 1931-2 Freiburg
lecture course The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theatetus (GA34).
From November 1933 to February 1934 (GA36/37), during Heidegger’s Rectorship, The
Essence of Truth lecture course was repeated, but repeated with an added introduction
addressing Heraclitus’ polemos fragment and additional numerous political allusions and
interpolations, all of which indicate Heidegger’s capitulation to the “priority of the
political,” the Nazi education policy that made political indoctrination compulsory in the
classroom.77 Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, composed in 1936-38, includes
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discussion of the allegory in several of its component ‘joints’ (§214, §232, §233) within
the larger joining section “The Grounding,” which develops Heidegger’s vision for a
‘new’ inceptual grounding of philosophical truth and the ‘future human being’ that
grounding entails. And, finally, Heidegger again revisits his interpretation of Plato's Cave
Allegory in the 1940 lecture/essay, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” one of Heidegger’s
explicit works on education outside of his Rectorship writings and a more ‘poetizing’
thinking than is usually acknowledged.
“Plato's Doctrine of Truth” is almost univocally read as a treatise by which
Heidegger argues two points: 1) the Cave Allegory depicts Plato’s “unsaid” “doctrine” or
teaching, which transforms the essence of truth from aletheia (unhiddenness,
unconcealedness) to orthotes (correctness of representation); 2) Plato’s transformation of
the essence of truth is the great event that begins the historical unfolding of western
metaphysical thinking, which leads to Nietzschean metaphysics, nihilism, and latemodern plight or dire need (Not).78 The fact that Heidegger devotes nearly half of the
exegetical discussion of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” to the matter of education is mostly
with Nazism, he opposed absolutely the priority of the political.” Heidegger’s version, in the Der
Spiegel interview, is that he resisted the Nazi priority of the political, and in Heidegger, Philosophy,
Nazism, 20ff, Young cites evidence corroborating Heidegger’s version on at least two occasions
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neglected in philosophical scholarship. If scholars address Heidegger’s thinking on
education in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” that thinking is usually taken to be preparatory
hermeneutic work for the two ‘main’ arguments (1 and 2 above) that follow from
Heidegger’s interpretation of the allegory. This preparatory work is taken to be necessary
because, as Heidegger reminds us, “Plato's assertion is clear: The ‘allegory of the cave’
illustrates the essence of ‘education,’” and Heidegger’s project is to show that “the
‘allegory’ not only illustrates the essence of education but at the same time opens our
eyes to a transformation in the essence of ‘truth,’” a transformation “that becomes the
hidden law governing what the thinker says” (P 167/GA9: 218). Heidegger scholarship
takes “not only” to indicate a pushing by the wayside of the matter of education for the
sake of showing transformation in the essence of truth; rather than taking “not only” to
indicate an equal regard of both, reflected in Heidegger’s subsequent questions, 1) “If the
‘allegory’ can show both, must it not be the case that an essential relation holds between
‘education’ and ‘truth’?” and 2) “what is it that links ‘education’ and ‘truth’ together into
an original and essential unity?” (P 167-8/GA9: 218)
One of my aims for this chapter is to turn the priorities of the usual position of
Heidegger scholarship on what matters in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” such that my stand
will be that “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” not only opens our eyes to a transformation in the
essence of “truth” but also, and at the same time, illustrates the essence of education.
Heidegger appropriates this essence of education for his philosophy of education, such
that by this essence, we may begin to understand what Heidegger takes education in its
proper sense to mean.
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A second aim for this chapter is to show 1) Heidegger’s thinking on what is
proper to the original, essential unity and relation of education and truth; 2) it is
Heidegger’s view that what is proper in that unity is deformed by the essence of truth as
orthotes (correctness of representation); 3) it is Heidegger’s view that what is deformed
in that unity leads to apaideia, a un-education or plighted education that is pervasive in
our late-modern time.
A third aim for this chapter, but addressed first, is to suggest that “Plato's
Doctrine of Truth” is not ultimately a treatise, or philosophical argument, but a poetizing
thinking of a kind that Heidegger is during the middle period attempting in other ‘forms,’
such as the fugal Contributions to Philosophy, and is explicitly elucidating in ‘more’
‘philosophical’ work from the middle period and early 1940s, work that overlaps with the
writing and presentation of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.”

2.2 “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” as Poetizing Thinking
As I hope to bring forth here, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” is a poetizing thinking,
thinking and poetizing the history of being-itself (Seyn/Sein) and the essence of
education, among its other purports. As a poetizing thinking, it creates and preserves a
thinking that stands within the understandings of its ontotheological epoch—late-modern
Nietzschean will to power and its nihilisms, including the everyday plights of its epoch’s
education and education—but also projects to stand apart and stand into the history of
being-itself (Seyn/Sein) both past and future. Of such a stand, Heidegger writes in The
Event (Das Ereignis), “Meditation on the thinking of the history of beyng, since this
thinking inceptually thinks thinking itself, must also enter into dialogue with the
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poetizing that poetizes the domain of poetry and thus must think through the relation
between poetizing and thinking (E 216/GA71: 250). It is my view that Heidegger’s
“Plato's Doctrine of Truth” is not a treatise or traditional philosophical argument that
counters or opposes Plato’s Cave Allegory and its interpretation but is a poetizing
thinking that encounters Plato’s thinking in its greatness, for the sake of thinking the
future need of education and human being.
What Heidegger means by poetizing (dichten) develops over his career of thought
and is a central concern of Heidegger’s middle and later thought.79 Poetizing (dichten)
and poetry (Dichten) belong together, as Heidegger makes explicit. Both stand in an
opening removed from and cleared of everyday understanding and ‘worlds.’ There, both
‘project truth’ as a new disclosure of “everything that it already is, though still hidden
from itself” and set that truth into work, “wherein truth is thrown toward the coming
preservers, that is, toward an historical group of men” (PLT 73/GA5: 63). Poetizing and
poetry (like any art, as Heidegger thinks art) are not acts of modern subjectivity, “the
self-sovereign subject's performance of genius,” but are a gathering from “that into which
human being as historical is already cast,” that is, from the groundings and ground of the
history of human intelligibility and its worlds (PLT 73/ GA5: 63). Poetizing and poetry of
a poet bring forth this gathering and bear forth a future in it. Poetizing and poetry imply
in that future issue a shift, a transformation, a new beginning, a turn, for poetizing and
poetry are inceptual and destining: what they bring forth, what their peculiar leap bears, is
a historical beginning, one that “already contains the [historical] end latent within itself”
79

Heidegger’s focus on poetizing and poetry intensifies with Heidegger’s first extended work on
Hölderlin (1934) and “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-6), continuing through the Nietzsche
lectures (1938-42) and later work on Hölderlin, which overlap with the writing Heidegger’s selfcritique of Contributions to Philosophy, The Event (Das Ereignis) (1941-2) and the writing and
presentation of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.”
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(PLT 74/GA5: 64). Further, “The truth that discloses itself in the work can never be
proved or derived from what went before” (PLT 73/GA5: 63).
The thinking aspect of a poetizing thinking, for Heidegger, is not “‘Thinking,’ in
the ordinary determination that has been usual for a long time, [as] the representation of
something in its idea [‘look’] as the koinon [‘common’], representing something in its
generality” (CP 51/GA65: 63). Instead, having let go and clear of the ordinary
determinations that have been usual for a long time, the thinking aspect of a poetizing
thinking stands out into the abyss of all possible thinkings and their projection, open to
something inceptual, hearkening toward the note of a future need, but doing so without
image, so as to remain open to possible projections and their imageless grasp: “Thinking
is the imageless opening up of the abyss.” (E 279/GA71: 322). As thinking is the
imageless opening up of the abyss, poetizing is “inventing—founding: ‘image’” (E
279/GA71: 321). “Poetry, although it exists only in the “element” of language, constantly
possesses in its words an “image,” that is, something to be intuited, through which and in
which it poetizes its compositions” (E 226/GA71: 262).
A poetizing thinking, for Heidegger, is a radical and cumulative and inceptual
gathering, all together. It thinks what has been—“Remembrance [Andenken] is a
poetizing thinking” (E 216/GA71: 250)—both radically and cumulatively. It thinks to the
root of what is, returning to original domains of questioning and thinking, and in those
domains doing what Heidegger thinks modern erudition and education (including modern
academic philosophy) cannot do: “modern erudition [Vielwisserei], the knowledge of
everything and discussing of everything, has lost its edge [unfähig; lit. become impotent]
long ago and is now incapable of radically differentiating between what we do
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understand, in the genuine sense, and what we do not understand, within the original
domains of questioning” (BAP 9/GA22: 12). It thinks cumulatively in thinking the history
of being, which, within the western philosophical tradition, is the chronological sequence
and unfolding of ontotheologies, or in other words, human beings’ essential grasps of the
supreme meaning of entities. And, a poetizing thinking and its thinker thinks inceptually:
thinkers “do not merely think ‘of’ what has been and what is coming; instead, they think
ahead into the beginning…. their thinking, as a thinking ahead, out of the pure separation
[from the current ‘knowledge’ tradition and its worlds], possesses something of the
character of grounding (that is, poetizing)” (E 211/GA71: 244).
What is at stake in seeing “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” as a poetizing thinking and
not a traditional philosophical argument ranges from ‘local’ concerns about the
presentation of the work to historical concerns of the greatest consequence for human
being and for Heidegger. First, and beginning with the local, taking “Plato's Doctrine of
Truth” as a poetizing thinking casts different light on its linguisticality and other
rhetorical decisions. Heidegger’s extensive and unrelenting use of ‘scare’ quotation
marks, drawing attention to words such as allegory, truth, education, idea, forms, image,
the good are meant to call into question our traditional take on the senses of these words,
pushing us to think them polysemically and question-worthy, or even to think them as
images of abysses, opening into unknown and not yet ungrounded encounters with the
meaning of allegory or truth or education apart from what we already think we know.
Taking “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” as a poetizing thinking casts different light on
the possibility and role of “violence” in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of the Cave Allegory
and, perhaps, in hermeneutic philosophy in general. Were we habituated differently to
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what constitutes or discredits philosophical thinking or response, Heidegger would not
need to address or apologize for ‘violence’—violations of hermeneutic propriety—as if it
were irrational or irresponsible when it founds, as does ‘poetic license,’ a bearing ground
for a new thinking, even as it is “of the unfamiliar and extraordinary, which means that it
also contains strife with the familiar and ordinary” (PLT 74/GA5: 64). Additionally,
taking “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” as a poetizing thinking can also answer the scholars
who have focused their commentary on what Heidegger gets wrong in the details, or
anomalies in, his interpretation of Plato's Cave Allegory and its translation into
Heideggerian German.

2.3 Future Need
Plato’s Cave Allegory is, perhaps, more credibly a poetizing thinking than is
Heidegger’s “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” As I understand Heidegger’s take on poetizing
thinking, explored explicitly in The Event (Das Ereignis) among other middle and later
works, one of the criteria for poetizing thinking, as I’ll develop below, is that a poetizing
thinking realizes and answers “future need.” As Heidegger says of his interpretation of
Plato's Cave Allegory and its saying in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,”
according to our interpretation, which is rendered necessary by a future
need, the ‘allegory’ not only illustrates the essence of education but at the
same time opens our eyes to a transformation in the essence of ‘truth.’ If
the ‘allegory’ can show both, must it not be the case that an essential
relation holds between ‘education’ and ‘truth’? This relation does, in fact,
obtain. And it consists in the fact that the essence of truth and the sort of
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transformation it undergoes here first make possible ‘education’ in its
basic structures. (P 167/GA9: 218)
There are several deep points here, some of which will make more sense in the
next chapter, where the Cave Allegory’s transformation in truth, as Heidegger says in
“Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” 1) “follows the change in the essence of truth, a change that
becomes the history of metaphysics, which in Nietzsche's thinking [specifically,
Nietzschean will to power and its nihilisms] has entered upon its unconditioned
fulfillment” and 2) begets the plight (Not), including plights in education, that make
visible or manifest a need for education in its basic structures (P 181/GA9: 237).
Appropriating the Cave Allegory as Heidegger does, interpreting it as he does, is
not for the sake of scholarly correctness but to open the question of the essential relation
between truth and education, and the need to think it. Such a need, Heidegger indicates
here, is “a future need,” which renders necessary the poetizing thinking of Heidegger’s
interpretation of the Cave Allegory that is “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” It may be a future
need that is not said or even acknowledged in, or by, a poetizing thinking but is of its
saying nonetheless, as an unsaid saying or unthought thought.80 I think Heidegger would
say that the Plato’s unsaid saying, his “doctrine” (Lehre) or transforming teaching on the
essence of truth, in the Cave Allegory is within what is said in the allegory, in Republic,
and in Plato’s thought for the sake of a future need within the history of being.
Such needs ‘dawn’ in the history of being, thinks Heidegger, and constitute
essential history’s (Geschichte) happenings, its dynamic, and the shared human destiny
(Geschick) that emerges human being’s historical decisions, which not the relatively
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For further elucidation of Heidegger’s thinking on unsaid sayings and unthought thoughts see What
is Called Thinking? (WCT 76-77/GA8: 82)
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trivial happenings that constitute our ordinary schooled sense of ‘history’ (Historie), but
the decisions that decide and destine the meaning of all entities and phenomena and their
worlds. To that point, Heidegger says at the end of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,”
Thus Plato's doctrine of ‘truth’ is not something that is past. It is
historically "present," not just in the sense that his teachings have a "later
effect" that historians can calculate, nor as a reawakening or imitation of
antiquity, not even as the mere preservation of what has been handed
down. Rather, this change in the essence of truth is present as the alldominating fundamental reality—long established and thus still in place—
of the ever-advancing world history of the planet in this most modern of
modern times. (P 181/GA9: 237)
Mark Ralkowski reminds us in his fine study, Heidegger’s Platonism, that
Heidegger is famous for his interpretation of Plato’s Cave Allegory and Plato’s thought
in general as having caused “the waning of the Greek experience of truth as aletheia” in
the subordination of aletheia to idea or as causing “subjectivism and ontotheology, the
fraternal twin evils of Heidegger’s history of Being that lead toward the crisis of
European nihilism and the ontological decline of the West,” including the ontological
decline of western education.81 But “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” is not an indictment of
Plato or Plato’s thought as causing the devolution of the west into nihilism and crisis; it is
not an argument within the discourse of Plato scholarship meant to get something ‘right’
about Plato and therein ‘advance’ truth in reading and teaching Plato. Heidegger’s
engagement with Plato is more properly educative, in terms of what means education for
Heidegger, than refutation or indictment. Simply said, Heidegger engages Plato not to
81

See Mark Ralkowski, Heidegger’s Platonism, 63.
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indict him but to learn from him and to appropriate Plato’s grasp of the essence of
education and its image for Heidegger’s own radical vision for education. He indicates
some of the pedagogic principles and activities of that vision in “Plato's Doctrine of
Truth”; a fuller presentation of that vision, as we shall consider later, emerges in the
earlier (though not public or published until 1989) Contributions to Philosophy.
Among the pedagogic principles and activities is Heidegger’s vision for education
is his view that in radical questioning and thinking—that is, a return to inceptual or
originating grounds of the history of human intelligibility and questioning and thinking
there—we may realize the questioning, thinking, and decisive grasps of what-is (entity,
phenomena) that determined or destined our current ‘knowledge’ tradition (western
philosophy as metaphysics) and its worlds of structures, truths, and activities. As image
of such a return, Heidegger gives us “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” wherein he returns to a
site—Plato's Cave Allegory—in which an ontological and ontotheological happening in
the history of being, specifically a shift in the essential meaning of truth, is occurring.
There, Heidegger endeavors to think truth near to Plato’s thinking truth in Plato's Cave
Allegory and, then, for the sake of future need, interpret Plato’s thinking and saying for
the sake of future need.
Heidegger is following his own later account of encountering a thinker’s thought,
in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” as in The Essence of Truth, Heidegger engages Plato by
going to Plato’s encounter as it is disclosed in the Cave Allegory.82 There, as spoken in
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As reminder of my introduction, Heidegger writes in What is Called Thinking?: “for a face-to-face
converse with the thinkers…. there are only two possibilities: either to go to their encounter, or to go
counter to them. If we want to go to the encounter of a thinker’s thought, we must magnify still further
what is great in him. Then we will enter into what is unthought in his thought. If we wish only to go
counter to a thinker’s thought, this wish must have minimized beforehand what is great in him. We
then shift his thought into the commonplaces of our know-it-all presumption. (WCT 77/ GA8: 83)

54

“Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger magnifies what is great in Plato and Plato's Cave
Allegory: that Plato’s “thinking follows (folgt) the change in the essence of truth” (P
181/GA9: 237). Heidegger magnifies what is great in Plato for the sake of learning
Plato’s unsaid saying, his “doctrine” (Lehre) or teaching on truth. That unsaid saying is
the poetized image of Heidegger’s poetizing thinking in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” The
thinking aspect of Heidegger’s poetizing thinking in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” is its
radical and cumulative and inceptual gathering for the sake of a future need, the need to
address what Heidegger sees as plight and crisis in the west, certainly on full display in
Nazi Germany as Heidegger composes “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.”
Heidegger’s view that in a great thinker’s thought and saying (a thinker may be an
artist or engineer and her ‘thought’ and ‘saying’ an image or a structure) a questioning
thinker may discern that thinker’s ‘unthought’ and ‘unsaying’ opens the poetizing
thinking of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” and forecasts that the work brings to light Plato’s
unsaid saying:
The knowledge that comes from the sciences is usually expressed in
propositions and laid before us as conclusions that we can grasp and put to
use. But the "doctrine" of a thinker is that which remains unsaid within
what is said, that to which we are exposed so that we might expend
ourselves on it. (P155/P9:203)
What Heidegger means by “exposed” and “expend” and “we” here is ambiguous.
The “we” may be all human being who is touched by a thinker’s unsaid saying and its
historical—because transforming human intelligibility and worlds—consequence. If so,
then this “we” is exposed (ausgesetzt) to the ‘doctrine’ or teaching of a thinker so we
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might expend (verschwende) ourselves on it, an exposing and expending that constitute
the unfolding of the history of being, its ontologies and ontotheologies. Or this “we” may
be the audience of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” and its poetizing thinking. If so, this “we”
is exposed (ausgesetzt) to the ‘doctrine’ or teaching of Plato so we might expend
(verschwende) ourselves on it. This expending would entail 1) realizing what follows
after Plato’s teaching and 2) reckoning with its consequences. Heidegger takes what
follows Plato’s teaching to be—without indicting Plato—Platonism and the
ontotheologies, including our late-modern Nietzschean will to power and nihilism.
Further, the words and connotative images Heidegger chooses for his saying here
are, in ausgesetzt (exposed) and verschwende (expend), evocative. Along with more
neutral senses, both carry negative senses: exposed as ‘exposed position’ or ‘out in the
open, but imperiled’; and expend as ‘lay waste,’ ‘spin one’s wheels,’ ‘dissipate.’ These
negative senses bear interestingly on both senses of “we.” If “we” are all human being
who is touched by Plato’s unsaid saying, then Heidegger is indicating that Plato’s unsaid
doctrine manifests a decisive historical happening, the transformation of the essence of
truth, to which human being was exposed so that human being might expend or dissipate
itself on or by that happening during the unfolding future. Though it might seem that
Heidegger is saying that Plato or Plato’s unsaid doctrine ‘caused’ that unfolding future,
which unfolds through the western philosophical tradition and its worldly manifestations
toward what Heidegger takes to be its end in late-modern nihilism, Heidegger is clear to
say later, both in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” and Contributions to Philosophy and
elsewhere that Plato’s thought follows or manifests a change in the essence of truth that is
a historical happening, not one that Plato or Plato’s thought caused, e.g: Plato’s “thinking
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follows (folgt) the change in the essence of truth” (P 181/GA9: 237).
That change, as Heidegger construes its depiction in Plato's Cave Allegory, is a
yoking of aletheia as experiential happening to its representation as idea. This shift
transforms or turns human intelligibility from 1) attention to the coming-intounconcealed-presencing of all-that-is (entities, phenomena, etc.) in their unique essence
(which the Greeks called aletheia, per Heidegger’s construal) to 2) attention toward a
conceptual representation of presencings in terms of their commonness, common look or
idea. In this shift, as Heidegger thinks it, human regard for entities (Seienden) turns from
a wondering, experiential welcoming of the presencing of what-is (entities, phenomena,
etc.), a welcoming that is restrained in its trying to preserve or shelter, but not ‘capture,’
that presencing in logos to pursuit of the idea. Pursuit of idea or concept is pursuit of the
correct or ‘true’ common look of entities or phenomena and is pursuit of the logos or
grasp that corresponds correctly to this look. The unconcealed presence of something
(Greek aletheia) becomes the experiencing of the idea instead of the presencing itself;
what is taken as ‘true’ or ‘truth’ is correct grasp of the idea rather than experiencing the
unconcealing of something. In the way that aletheia as unconcealing offers degrees of
unconcealing in a human’s experience of what is unconcealing and seen, so does truth as
idea (orthotes) offer degrees of correct grasp of the idea. However, it is Heidegger’s view
that, as correct grasp of idea overcomes experiencing unconcealing presencing itself, and
as idea unfolds to become not only concept but also concept-as-entity, such that ideas are
objects of thought, exchange, and even commerce, the aletheic presencing of the entities
and phenomena that ideas represent dissipates and withdraws, hollowing both the
meaningful presence of truth, human being’s intelligibility of the entities and phenomena
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of its worlds, and human being itself, inasmuch as humans are, for Heidegger, essentially
the place—the there—where meaningful presence or being (Sein/Seyn) happens or
‘events.’ The emptying or withdrawing of meaningful presence, including from ‘truth’
itself, is the characterizing essential happening of our late-modern world. As Heidegger
realizes in thinking that truth and education are linked in an original and essential unity, a
shift in the essential meaning of truth at the site of Plato's Cave Allegory is also a shift in
the essential meaning of education.

2.4 Paideia and Apaideia
In “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” as a poetizing thinking, Heidegger depicts a
‘thought-image’ of his own learning from Plato’s unsaid saying and its ‘teaching’ of a
transformation in the essential meaning of truth that manifests in Plato’s thought. “Plato's
Doctrine of Truth” shows Heidegger thinking the Cave Allegory’s depiction of the
“original and essential unity” of truth and education, a thinking for which Heidegger had
done extensive preparatory thinking in his close reading of the Cave Allegory in The
Essence of Truth. In The Essence of Truth, Heidegger’s explicit focus is the
transformation in the essence truth. Heidegger follows that transformation through a
study of Cave Allegory’s image of a pedagogical happening—the turning of the prisoner
from the cave wall and compelling him toward the ideas and their illumination by the
highest idea—but the pedagogy itself of the pedagogical happening is hardly Heidegger’s
concern in The Essence of Truth. However, in the only section of The Essence of Truth
explicitly addressing education (as paideia), Heidegger does indicate several aspects of
what will become his more mature vision of education in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.”
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First, he quotes the statement that introduces the Plato's Cave Allegory in Republic:
“Picture to yourself [namely the following image as given in the cave allegory] our
human nature in respect of its possible positionedness [Gehaltenheit] on the one hand, or
lack of bearings [Haltungslosigkeit] on the other hand” (ET 83/GA34: 114). As
Heidegger offers as reminder “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” “Plato's assertion is clear: The
‘allegory of the cave’ illustrates the essence of ‘education’” (P 167/GA34: 218), then
implied here is that education affects “positionedness” and “bearings” of human nature,
which indeed it does for Heidegger.
Further, Heidegger says of education in The Essence of Truth:
Paideia is not education [Bildung], but…that which prevails as our
ownmost being, both in respect of that to which it empowers itself, and
also of what, in its powerlessness, it loses, of that into which it
degenerates. It is not a matter just of paideia, but paideias te peri kai
apaideusias, of the one as well as the other, that is, of their confrontation
or setting-apart, of what is between both and out of which they both arise,
so that they may then assert themselves against each other. Paideia is the
positionedness [Gehaltenheit] of man, arising from the 'stance' [Haltung]
of the withstanding that carries through [sich durchsetzenden
Standhaltens] wherein man, in the midst of beings, freely chooses the
footing [Halt] for his own essence, i.e. that whereto and wherein he
empowers himself in his essence. This innermost empowerment of our
own essence to the essence of man, this free choice of footing by an entity
given over to itself, is, as occurrence, nothing else but philosophizing, as
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the questioning that presses through to being and unhiddenness, i.e. to
what itself empowers unhiddenness. (ET 83/GA34: 114-5)
What Heidegger speaks in this thinking on education is difficult to grasp and less
lucid than his thinking ten years later on the essence of education in “Plato's Doctrine of
Truth,” but we may gather of Heidegger’s thinking on education in The Essence of Truth
that 1) Paideia is not education [Bildung]; 2) paideia arises out of philosophizing, the
innermost faculty of the essence of human being; 3) when human beings fall away from
philosophizing (which is their innermost essence), paideia degenerates into apaideia; 4)
paideia and apaideia are in polemos, dynamic strife; 5) paideia in its arising out of
philosophizing realizes a human being’s positionedness, or standpoint.
There are some notable differences between what paideia “is” here in The
Essence of Truth and what is education in its essence in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” It is
possible that The Essence of Truth passage is a “construction site” (Baustellen) in the
unfolding of Heidegger’s thought and work on education; that is, a ‘site’ never
abandoned but built upon and subsumed into later thought” (OWL 21/GA12: 21). Or, as
Heidegger is presenting in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” what he takes to be Plato’s
essential “illustration” in the Cave Allegory of essence of education, it is possible that the
essence of education that Heidegger brings forth in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” belongs
more to Plato than to Heidegger or more to Heidegger’s poetizing thinking and the image
of Plato’s unsaid saying that Heidegger is unfolding than to what Heidegger takes to be
his own essence of education. It is my sense that all of these possibilities are in play.
In The Essence of Truth passage, Heidegger says paideia is not the German
Bildung, but in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger writes,
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the German word Bildung [formation] comes closest to capturing the word
paideia, but not entirely,” and it comes closest only if Bildung is restored
to its original power as a word, [wherein] Bildung means “forming people
in the sense of impressing on them a character that unfolds and ‘forming’
by antecedently taking measure in terms of some paradigmatic image,
which for that reason is called the proto-type [Vorbild]. Thus at one and
the same time ‘formation’ means impressing a character on people and
guiding people by a paradigm. The contrary of paideia is apaideia lack of
formation, where no fundamental bearing is awakened and unfolded, and
where no normative proto-type is put forth. (P 166/GA9: 217)
What all Heidegger is up to here is multifold and ironic. On the one hand,
Heidegger is sincerely indicating that paideia, like Bildung in its original sense and
power, impresses a guiding, paradigmatic character, probably a philosophical character.
On the other hand, the reiteration of ‘form,’ even more numerous in an unabridged
quotation of the passage, indicates that Heidegger in considering Plato’s sense of paideia
is questioning an educational ‘form’-ation that impresses a character in terms of a
paradigm or normative proto-type that is deformative or, in terms of the passage from
The Essence of Truth, is falling away from philosophizing and, therein, invoking
apaideia.
Absent from the account in The Essence of Truth is the emphasis in “Plato's
Doctrine of Truth” on the “movements of passage” from stage to stage depicted in the
Cave Allegory (stage 1: the prisoner turned to cave wall. Stage 2: the prisoner unshackled
and turned to the fire in the cave. Stage 3: the liberated cave-dweller compelled into the
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sunlight outside the cave. Stage 4: the liberated cave-dweller turning his gaze to the sun.)
These movements of passage, as Heidegger characterizes them, have three fundamental
characteristics: slow, steady, and turning. They are slow because the “turning around has
to do with one’s being and takes place in the very ground of one’s essence; they are
steady because the turning must “develop into a stable comportment”; and they are
turning because, “as Plato defines its essence, paideia means the periagoge holes tes
psyches, leading the whole human being in the turning around of his or her essence” (P
166/GA9 216-7).
Furthermore, as Heidegger explains in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,”
The “allegory of the cave” concentrates its explanatory power on making
us able to see and know the essence of paideia by means of the concrete
images recounted in the story. At the same time Plato seeks to avoid false
interpretations; he wants to show that the essence of paideia does not
consist in merely pouring knowledge into the unprepared soul as if it were
some container held out empty and waiting. On the contrary, genuine
education takes hold of our very soul and transforms it in its entirety by
first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming
us to it. (P 167/GA9: 217)
Again, what all Heidegger is up to here is ambiguous and/or ironic, but befitting a
poetizing thinking, what he is up to is not literal exegesis. In “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”
Heidegger is, as Plato is in the Cave Allegory, concentrating the explanatory power of his
poetizing thinking on making his audience able to see and know the essence of paideia.
Like Plato, Heidegger seeks to avoid false interpretations. Like Plato, Heidegger wants to
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show that the essence of paideia does not consist in merely pouring knowledge into the
unprepared soul as if it were some container held out empty and waiting.83 And, for
(only) Heidegger, genuine education takes hold of our very soul and transforms it in its
entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to
it—it is noteworthy that Heidegger doesn’t explicitly attribute this expression of
education to Plato. Noteworthy too is that this expression speaks “genuine education.”
The sequence of statements here, slow and steady, are meant to turn Heidegger’s
audience toward what is questionworthy (and, therein, questionable) about ‘paideia’ as
depicted in Plato's Cave Allegory. Heidegger accepts Plato’s takes on the essence of
paideia and its process, and he appropriates these takes for his philosophical
understanding of education, its essence, and its processes: 1) Heidegger accepts that
genuine education (paideia) must consist of movements of passage that should be slow,
steady, and gradual, so that “the human essence is reoriented and accustomed to the
region assigned to it at each point” or stage (P 166/GA9: 216); 2) Heidegger accepts that
education is essentially periagogic, a turning; and, 3) Heidegger accepts that genuine
education awakens and unfolds a fundamental bearing in the “innermost” “ownmost
being” (to borrow from the passage from The Essence of Truth quoted above).
What Heidegger does not accept without question is the ‘form’-ation aspect of
Bildung and Platonic paideia when the “proto-type” deforms or fails to awaken and
unfold the philosophizing “innermost” or “ownmost being” of human being, or when
‘education’ fails to a human to the place or ‘positionedness’ of our essential being. Such
‘form-’ation, such ‘education’ is for Heidegger apaideia.
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Heidegger might say “jug” instead of container, and as I’ll show in Chapter 4, the image of apaideia
as filling a jug is particularly powerful for what Heidegger suggests is paideia, or genuine education.
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Furthermore, though Heidegger accepts the Cave Allegory’s depiction of the
movements of education as indeed unconcealing the essence of paideia, in contrast to
apaideia, what Heidegger does not accept from his standpoint, as he regards his
standpoint within late-modernism, is what the education depicted in the Cave Allegory
turns its liberated prisoner learner to. The Cave Allegory depicts an education in
mastering knowing the ideas; it depicts an education in metaphysical knowing. It depicts
a paideia that turns its learner to the ideas and the highest idea and to their pursuit. It
positions its learner to regard entities in terms of their common look as idea and to turn
from aletheic presencing of the entities and phenomena. Heidegger interprets the
educational turning and repositioning of the human learner as it is depicted in the Cave
Allegory to be apaideia not paideia, and, then, a deforming turning and education. It
deforms because paradigmatic image of a human positioned toward ideas fails, as
Heidegger thinks it, to position human being in the place of its essential being and
accustoming us to it. That place is aletheia and its happening in Ereignis. Heidegger’s
accustoming, or preparing, human being for that place and happening includes his
educative appropriation of Plato's Cave Allegory and its depiction of paideia and turning
that depiction to become his unsaid saying in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”: that the paideia
of metaphysics is apaideia.

2.5 Thinking Heidegger to Thank Plato
Heidegger’s encounter with Plato in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” and the disclosure
of apaideia in the Cave Allegory’s paideia is not an indicting of Plato but is instead
commemorating and ‘thanking,’ thanking Plato for what his thought holds for the sake of
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human future need, a future that is upon and yawning before late-modern human being.
As Heidegger spotlights in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” apaideia and paideia belong
together, for “paideia is essentially a movement of passage, namely, from apaideia to
paideia” (P 166/GA9: 217). Thus, what is apaideia in the Cave Allegory can compel a
movement of passage to paideia, if the plight of apaideia is thought and its need
answered.
About poetizing thinking, or thoughtful poetizing, and its thanking, Heidegger
writes in The Event, a notebook nearly contemporary with “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”:
“thanking as thoughtful poetizing. 1, the thanking is a poetizing—greeting. 2, the
thanking is a thinking—as a questioning of that which is worthy of question” (E
285/GA71: 328). In Heidegger’s poetizing thinking that is “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,”
Heidegger is thanking Plato for Plato’s greatness as a thinker, particularly Plato’s
greatness as a being-historical-thinker, inasmuch as Plato’s thinking instantiates a
significant shift in the history of the truth of what-is. Such thanking is also a questioning,
a challenging forth of the ground or ‘earth’ of a great thinker (and, again, not an
indictment), for the sake of what that thinker’s saying and unsaying can teach. It is also a
“greeting”—a meeting and encountering of that thinker in his or her own encounter, for
the sake of discerning what is unsaid or unthought there.
Evident in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” as in The Essence of Truth, is Heidegger’s
engaging with Plato by going to Plato’s encounter as it is disclosed in the Cave Allegory.
In “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger magnifies what is great in Plato and Plato's
Cave Allegory—that Plato’s “thinking follows (folgt) the change in the essence of truth”
(P 181/GA9: 237)—and magnifies what is great in Plato for the sake of learning Plato’s
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unsaid saying, his “doctrine” (Lehre) or teaching on truth. That unsaid saying is the
poetized image of Heidegger’s poetizing thinking in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” If that
unsaid saying is the poetizing aspect of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” as a poetizing
thinking, then the thinking aspect of Heidegger’s poetizing thinking in “Plato's Doctrine
of Truth” is the work’s radical and cumulative and inceptual gathering for the sake of a
future need, the need to address what Heidegger sees as plight and crisis in the West,
increasingly manifest in Nazi Germany as Heidegger composes “Plato's Doctrine of
Truth.”
It is Ralkowski’s view that “at some point during the 1930s, however, for reasons
he never fully explained, Heidegger’s understanding of Plato’s place and role in the
history of Western philosophy changed significantly. By the time Heidegger published
‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ in 1940, Plato was no longer the philosopher in whose
thought we might recover ‘the history of man’s essence’(ET 84).”84 By my reckoning of
“Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger does see Plato as a philosopher in whose thought
we might recover ‘the history of man’s essence,’ and does so as of 1940, when he
composes “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” Else, we would not have Heidegger’s elucidation
of Plato’s unsaid “doctrine” on the essence of truth, or truth’s essential relation to
education, or Heidegger’s appropriation of Plato’s teaching for his own radical vision for
education.
In other senses, though, Ralkowski is right that by the time Heidegger published
‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ in 1940, Heidegger no longer thought Plato’s ontotheological
view of being itself as the “highest” idea or “Good” the thinking of being itself by which

84

See Mark Ralkowski, Heidegger’s Platonism, 63.

66

human being might recover “‘the history of man’s essence.’” Heidegger says in the only
section of The Essence of Truth explicitly mentioning education (as paideia),
If, therefore, the perceiving of the idea constitutes the ground upon which
man as a being comports himself to beings, then to the highest idea there
must correspond a perceiving that occurs most deeply in the essence of
man. The questioning which penetrates through to the highest idea is thus
simultaneously a questioning down into the deepest perceiving possible
for man as an existing being, a questioning of the history of man's essence
that aims at understanding what empowers being and unhiddenness. We
have followed this question of the history of man's essence in our
interpretation of the cave allegory, and we have seen that it is a quite
definite occurrence with quite definite stages and transitions (ET
81/GA34: 112).
Heidegger is here chasing his most fundamental question—What allows for
meaningfulness? (“what empowers being and unhiddenness”?)—and is finding in his
reading of the Cave Allegory that what makes Plato’s highest idea ‘good’ is that it 1)
makes possible “the ground upon which man as a being comports himself to beings” and
2) calls for “a perceiving that occurs most deeply in the essence of man.” Further, in a
sentence that resonates with the questioning and purport Heidegger depicts himself to be
pursuing in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger speaks a notable duality, if not
ambiguity, in the “idea” that makes possible the ground and perceiving that occur most
deeply in humans: “The questioning which penetrates through to the highest idea is thus
simultaneously a questioning down into the deepest perceiving possible for man as an
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existing being, a questioning of the history of man's essence that aims at understanding
what empowers being and unhiddenness.” Questioning that idea involves both an up (as
highest) and down (into the deepest). This duality—and ambiguity, I would say, as
Heidegger also does—at this moment in Heidegger’s reading of Plato indicates that an
essential transformation in Heidegger’s thinking about “what empowers being and
unhiddenness” is underway, a transformation toward a critique of metaphysics as
ontotheology. Further, it is underway in a way analogous to the ambiguity and
simultaneous appearance of truth as aletheia and truth as orthotes in Plato’s Cave
Allegory, which also indicates an essential transformation underway.
By 1936-38 and Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger has let go Plato’s idea of
the ‘Good’ as that which constitutes, empowers, and lights the essential questioning and
perceiving of humans. So, indeed, in this way, Ralkowski is right that Heidegger is no
longer looking to Plato and Plato’s idea of the ‘Good’ as that by which humans might
recover the history of man’s essence. Instead, as Ralkowski’s study argues, “to counter
Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism and exhaustion of the possibilities opened up by
original metaphysical questions, Heidegger argues for a fundamentally Platonic account
of Being as such: a return to authentic (non-metaphysical) Platonism. However, what
Heidegger leaps from in Plato’s account of Being-as-such is its position as “highest” in
Plato’s thought, is its representation as sun above, is its ontotheological ‘lighting’ of
entities from without, subordinating their lighting—or presencing—from within. What
Heidegger leaps from too is the position of human being toward entities called for in
Platonism and both depicted and ‘taught to’ the prisoner in the Cave Allegory: in
Platonism, human beings turn their backs on the entities and phenomena of the earth, as

68

does the prisoner in leaving the earth of the cave, and instead turn their gaze and attention
to what’s ‘highest’ and direct their pedagogical energies (at risk of death in the Cave
Allegory) to compelling fellow humans to turn their backs to entities and their gaze to the
sun and what’s highest.85
What Heidegger leaps to during the 1930s is no highest ‘Good’ but is being-itself
(Seyn/Sein), without metaphysical divinization. This being-itself is imagized as “earth”
and regarded as lowest, because a ground-source unformed, a no-thing, rather than the
ultimate form and entity that the Platonic ‘Good’ is. The question corresponding to this
being-itself is not “what are entities?,” which metaphysics answers as “the Being of
beings” (Sein des Seiendes), thinking ‘up’ toward whatever metaphysical entity is holding
sway in its respective western ontotheological age (the idea of the Good for the Platonic
Greeks, Creator-God in the Middle Ages, no-God or dead-God in latemodernNietzscheanism). Instead, the question corresponding to being-itself (Seyn/Sein),
without metaphysical divinization, is “what is truth of beyng?” Heidegger takes this
question to call for “a questioning down into the deepest perceiving possible for man as
an existing being [emphasis mine]” and “a questioning of the history of man's essence
that aims at understanding what empowers being and unhiddenness,” for this question
and its questioning leads human being to find and found what Heidegger calls “beinghistorical-truths,” each one a ground in its time for the meaning of what-is and the
bringing forth of intelligibilities on or by that ground. This is not, as is Platonism, a
questioning ‘up’ to perceive form—ontotheological light—already there and merely
recollecting it. It is instead a human questioning ‘down’ and into and toward the
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inexhaustible source of grounds and intelligible groundings and, there, gathering
originally and originatingly truth that lights the unfolding of worlds by a non-traditional
ontological understanding. That non-traditional ontological understanding is essentially
temporal, and “not ultimate but stands under an empowerment,” which for Heidegger in
the middle 1930s, is historical being-itself (Seyn/Sein). While this might seem a nonmetaphysical, but nonetheless fundamentally Platonic, account of Being as such, as
Ralkowski reads it, it is at the same time fundamentally other than Platonic ‘Being as
such.’
Heidegger’s leap in the middle 1930s from metaphysical fundamental ontology
and its questioning ‘up’ to perceive form—ontotheological light—already there toward
historical ontotheology (within metaphysics) and the prospect of a radical ontological
“truth-event” in human being’s encounter with historical being-itself (Seyn/Sein) happens
especially in response to what Heidegger perceives to be plight (Not) and need in the
university and the significance of their “happening” (LQ 55/GA38: 60). This leap,
motivated by plight and its privation, discloses, as we will see in Chapter 3, a radical shift
in Heidegger’s thinking and questioning of being itself.
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3
PLIGHT, CRISIS, AND NEED—THE NOT IN THINKING HEIDEGGER
3.1 Crisis and Paradigm Shift
Thomas Sheehan, an accomplished Heidegger scholar of nearly fifty years, has
focused his work of the past fifteen years on his argument for a “paradigm shift” in the
reading of Heidegger.86 Sheehan’s call for, and account of the need for, a paradigm shift
in the reading of Heidegger and in Heidegger scholarship can, for my study, can serve as
an analogy by which Heidegger’s project for educational preparation in Contributions to
Philosophy may be made more approachable and, then, Heidegger’s contribution to our
thinking on education may be made more clear. The term “paradigm shift” of course
originated with Thomas Kuhn in 1970, but the idea of paradigm shift is more originally
Heideggerian and, in Heidegger’s version, is even more fundamental than Kuhn’s, as this
chapter aims to introduce. A Kuhnian paradigm shift accomplishes a foundational
revolution in scientific intelligibility, as exemplified in the shift from Aristotelian
classical physics to Newtonian physics and, later, the shift from Newtonian physics to
quantum physics. In a Kuhnian revolutionary paradigm shift, the organizational and
interpretive structure of a science undergoes revision in order to account for, and
incorporate, anomalies in the science’s prior range of knowledge and insight. These
anomalies can be said to indicate or belong to deficiencies or wants in the interpretive
structure holding sway. In sufficient number or degree, these wants amount to crisis that
needs or calls for radical revision in the interpretive paradigm.
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In its most radical and fundamental version, Heidegger’s vision for paradigm shift
is a revolution in ontological intelligibility, turning human being-in-its-ownmost-essence
from one most fundamental ontological standpoint to another. As we saw in Chapter 2,
Heidegger takes such radical turning to be the essence of education. Heidegger’s earlier,
more fundamental version of revolution in intelligibility points most radically toward
fundamental revolution in ontological intelligibility, albeit an ontological intelligibility
that is other than the ontology of the western philosophical tradition and its metaphysics.
Further, and in only one degree less radically, Heidegger’s earlier, more fundamental
version of revolution in intelligibility points toward fundamental revolution in
ontotheological intelligibility. Heidegger’s thinking on revolution, or shift, or turn in
ontological and ontotheological intelligibility constitutes one of the central ideas in the
Heidegger’s thought as a whole.
This central idea is neither briefly nor simply explained and a full explanation is
beyond the scope of this study. In one of Heidegger’s formulations—Heidegger’s account
of the “history of being”— Heidegger’s argues 1) that the meaning of “being” (Sein) is
ontologically historical in ‘all time,’ unfolding and shifting through time, and 2) that
within western metaphysics and its temporal duration, the meaning of “being” (Sein) is
ontotheologically historical. An ontotheological revolution, or ontotheological ‘paradigm
shift’ in intelligibility takes place within the western philosophical tradition, which in its
essence is, for Heidegger, ontology practiced as metaphysics. More specifically,
Heidegger sees the western philosophical tradition as having an ontotheological structure
and constituted as a series of ontotheological epochs (for example, 1) Ancient Greek, 2)
Platonic, 3) Medieval, 4) Modern, 5) Nietzschean late-modern), each one indicating an
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ontotheological revolution and shift.87 Each epoch answers essentially differently the
guiding question of western philosophy as metaphysics is tí to ón, “what are entities?”
(CP 30/GA65: 38). By this guiding question and its answering, Heidegger says,
metaphysics determines and grounds the meaning of the “being of entities” (Sein des
Seiendes) as a whole, and in so doing, metaphysics posits “the truth about the totality of
entities as such.”88 This truth—the meaning of entities as a whole—is an ontotheological
stand or position. In its ontological capacity, this ontotheological stand determines the
innermost meaning or ground of entities—the essential meaning that unifies all that is (in
the sense of, “all entities are X’). In its theological capacity, this ontotheological stand
determines the outermost or supreme meaning or ground of entities—“the indefinite or
infinite source and ultimate destination of all entities” (such as Anaximander’s apeiron,
or the “form of the Good” in Platonism, or Christianity’s Creator-God) and that “from
which reality derives and by appeal to which the meaningfulness of reality can be
vindicated.”89 An ontotheological revolution, or ontotheological ‘paradigm shift’ in
intelligibility, then, is a shift in the holistic intelligibility of all phenomena and things, all
entities, anything that in any way “is”: for example, what nature is to the Greeks, or how
nature appears to the Greeks, is essentially different from what nature is or how it is
regarded by late-modern Nietzschean nihilists.
As Heidegger thinks it, an ontological revolution, or ontological ‘paradigm shift’
in intelligibility takes place in an inceptual “temporal-spatial playing field” or open
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clearing, clear of or not trodden upon by the worlds, structures. knowings, and ‘answers’
already realized. Within this open clearing, new modes of questioning being-itself
(Sein/Seyn) philosophies—other than the western philosophical tradition and its
metaphysics—are disclosed (CP 335ff./GA65: 424ff.). By this view, the western
philosophical tradition as metaphysics, what we know traditionally as “philosophy,” is
the “first beginning” of philosophy, to be followed by other beginnings, other guiding
questions than the tí to ón, “what are entities?” of metaphysics, other ontological posits or
positions than that of metaphysics toward beings, other philosophies, other traditions,
other modes of intelligibility other than those realized in the unfolding of the western
philosophical tradition as metaphysics, and other worlds of intelligibility and their
structures, activities, meaningfulnesses. We may find hints or analogues of this otherness
in non-western thought, traditions, intelligibilities, worlds.
Sheehan argues that the need for paradigm shift in the reading of Heidegger’s
works and thought emerges from Sheehan’s view 1) that Heidegger scholarship has
disclosed “a caricature of his philosophy,” and 2) that this scholarship offers a reading of
Heidegger’s works and thought, especially since the publication of Contributions to
Philosophy, that “is no longer able to accommodate the full range of his lectures and
writings as they are now published in his virtually complete Gesamtausgabe.”90 In other
words, among the more recently published volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe there
are anomalous texts that don’t fit Heidegger scholarship’s interpretive paradigm. Further,
this paradigm discloses a Heidegger who, as caricature, is but a representation of
Heidegger that is not-Heidegger, not fully what Heidegger was “driving at,” as Sheehan
characterizes it in his own preferred plain-speak. Sheehan recently characterized this need
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for paradigm shift in Heidegger scholarship as emerging from crisis: “Heidegger
scholarship is in crisis these days, and not just because his anti-Semitism has recently
been put on full display. The crisis, rather, is that almost ninety years after his major
work was published and sixty years after his best work was finished, Heidegger scholars
still cannot agree on what he was driving at.”91
The current paradigm, Sheehan reminds us, is what Sheehan calls “the classical
paradigm,” established by his teacher William Richardson’s Heidegger: Through
Phenomenology to Thought (1963). The classical paradigm posits that 1) Heidegger’s
main concern is the meaning of being; 2) the fundamental or guiding question of
Heidegger’s thought is “what is being (Sein)?”; and, 3) there is a turn in Heidegger’s
thinking during Heidegger’s middle period from Heidegger’s pursuing the guiding
question “what is being?” in terms of fundamental ontology (“Heidegger I” or ‘early’
Heidegger) to Heidegger’s pursuing the guiding question “what is being?” in terms of
historical ontotheology or ‘history of being’(“Heidegger II” or ‘later’ Heidegger).92 The
classical paradigm, says Sheehan, which established “the ‘being’ discourse, the Seinology that has dominated Heidegger research for the last half-century,….[and] has
exhausted its explanatory power.”93
One of the signs of the exhaustion of the explanatory power of the classical
paradigm of Heidegger scholarship is Kuhnian anomaly (the anomalous Heidegger texts
and their thought, especially seen in light of the publication of Contributions to
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Philosophy, that don’t fit the classical paradigm). A more fundamental sign of the
exhaustion of the classical paradigm’s explanatory power is its errancy, what the
classical paradigm does not ‘get right’ about Heidegger’s thought. What the classical
paradigm and its Sein-ology doesn’t get right, according to Sheehan, are two fundamental
points. First, Heidegger’s principal concern was never was fundamental ontology, the
“being” of entities (Sein des Seienden)—even before the classical paradigm’s view of the
so-called turn in Heidegger’s thinking. The “turn” and the common perception
established by the classical paradigm’s Sein-ology that Heidegger is the philosopher of
metaphysical being pursuing the ontological and ontotheological question spoken in
Being and Time—What is being?—are erroneous. There was no turn; there are no two
Heideggers, Heidegger I and Heidegger II. Instead, Sheehan claims that Heidegger was a
phenomenologist throughout his entire career of thought, pursuing phenomenology as
“the meaningful presence (Anwesen) of things within contexts of human concerns and
interests.”94 Consequently, Heidegger’s focus is not Sein-ology but meaningful
presencing (Anwesen). The second point missed by the classical paradigm is that
Heidegger wanted to move beyond analyzing meaningfulness as that which makes things
intelligibly present to us. Instead, Sheehan tells us “he was after what allows for
meaningfulness”—and that is Ereignis.95 The classical paradigm misses Ereignis, the
event of meaningful disclosing (“truth” as aletheia) intelligible to human being in human
being’s encounter with the retractive source (beyng/Seyn in Contributions) of all
meaningful intelligibility.
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Several times in work after 1935, Heidegger confirms Sheehan’s view that the
question of what allows for meaningfulness is Heidegger’s unique question and concern.
First in the prelude of Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger writes, “the question of
‘meaning [Sinn],’ that is, according to the elucidations in Being and Time [Sein und Zeit],
the question of the grounding of a projected domain, or, in short, the question of the truth
of beyng, is and remains my question and is my unique question, for at issue in it is
indeed what is most unique.” (CP 11/GA65: 10-11). In Ereignis happens “the truth of
beyng,” “the grounding of a projected domain.” Or, in other words, in human being that
is creatively open to the self-concealing source of all meaningful intelligibility
(beyng/Seyn/Sein), truth preserves (though not permanently) a happening of meaningful
intelligibility and by that truth and its shining forth a projected brightness, other
meaningful grasps are possible. This ‘truth-event’ is Ereignis.
In Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger is seeking and aiming to prepare
human ‘students’ for Ereignis on the largest possible scale: an Ereignis, or truth-event,
that finds, founds, and grounds “another beginning” for western philosophy. Such an
Ereignis would be the most radical and most far reaching possible paradigm shift, for
Heidegger in Contributions is calling for a radical restart to the western philosophical
tradition as metaphysics and a radical restart all worlds and structures of intelligibility
that unfold from any inceptual philosophical ground. By Heidegger’s analysis of the
ontotheological history of western metaphysics, the western philosophical tradition as
metaphysics is at its end with Nietzschean metaphysics, which manifests as nihilism,
wherein the meaning of being—or the meaning of meaningful presence in whatever form
(as life, science, art, book, education)—is nothing more than a resource for optimized
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commodification. In the Nietzschean ontotheological age or epoch of western
metaphysics, thinks Heidegger, meaningful presence has so drained from human
encounters with entities and phenomena, from how entities and phenomena are
experienced and ‘show up’ to human beings, that human encounters with phenomena are
now deformed, in crisis, and in need of a revolutionary turn.
As Heidegger calls for a radical, comprehensive, ontological paradigm shift in
western philosophy —a radical reappropriation of the truth or meaning of what-is (all
phenomena, entities, anything that ‘is’)—so is Sheehan calling for a radical,
comprehensive, ontological paradigm shift in the reading of Heidegger or in Heidegger
scholarship. Both Heidegger’s project and Sheehan’s project call for ‘ontological’ shift
inasmuch as each is seeking a regrounding, or re-truthing, of the ontological meaning of
their field of entities—the totality of all that-is in the case of Heidegger; and all that-is of
Heidegger’s works and thought in the case of Sheehan. Where Heidegger finds errancy in
western philosophy’s first tradition, fundamental ontology as metaphysics, Sheehan finds
errancy in Heidegger scholarship’s first tradition, the “classical tradition” as Sein-ology.
Where Sheehan’s argument for paradigm shift in Heidegger scholarship aims to ‘teach’
or direct its audience toward a new reading of Heidegger, to bring forth a new
interpretative ‘worlding’ of Heidegger’s textual ‘earth,’ Heidegger in his educative
capacity in Contributions to Philosophy aims to prepare those willing to ‘learn’ as
guided, in order to bring forth a new philosophical ‘worlding’ of intelligible ‘earth’
(Seyn, for Heidegger in Contributions).
Sheehan’s argument, his presentation of his case for paradigm shift, is not as
dramatically urgent as Heidegger’s plea for the overturning of metaphysics, but in most
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senses, less is at stake in Sheehan’s case. With Heidegger, what is at stake is
meaningfulness of all that is, including the meaning of human being, since, for
Heidegger, the essential function, the essential energeia of human being, is to be-at-work
in disclosing meaningful presence of what-is (as it is the meaning of a Heidegger scholar
to be at work disclosing the meaningful presence of Heidegger’s work and thought).
Sheehan doesn’t appear to think that Heidegger scholars need any more direction or
‘education’ in disclosing the meaningful presence of Heidegger’s work and thought
beyond his argument that the classical paradigm, Sein-ology is at its end, has “exhausted
its explanatory power.” In other words, Sheehan seems to presume that if he can persuade
those who disclose Heideggerian meaning of the anomalies and the errancy of Sein-ology
in its reading of Heidegger—specifically that it misses Heidegger’s continual
phenomenological standpoint and his central concern Ereignis—and if Sheehan can
persuade them of “crisis” in Heidegger scholarship that these anomalies and errancies
indicate, then readers of Heidegger and Heidegger scholars as ‘scientists’ will respond to
the need for shift and find their way to their disclosing a new interpretive paradigm of
what Heidegger is driving at. They will find their way to what is most question-worthy in
the intimations Sheehan presents and, then, in whatever intimations ensue therein.
Sheehan presumes that they know their way around the temporal-spatial playing field of
reading and disclosing Heidegger. Heidegger, by contrast, thinks that those who will
enact his paradigm shift need direction or educative “preparation” (Vorbereitung) in
order to respond appropriately radically to the call of late-modern anomaly, which
Heidegger designates in Contributions to Philosophy as plight or dire need (Not).
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As we saw in Chapter Two, Heidegger accepts Plato’s descriptive form or shape
of paideia in Cave Allegory, but not deformation it yields within its program of study,
specifically the question it pursues—tí to ón , what are entities?—and its prevailing
answer: being (or meaning) as correctness of representation or objectification. Heidegger
accepts Plato’s view that education is essentially a turning. He accepts that this turning
consist of slow and steady movements of passage through a series of stages to accustom a
learner to the bearing of each stage. He accepts that genuine education awakens and
unfolds an innermost disposition. He accepts that genuine education leads a human being
to the place of ownmost being, belonging, and concerns. But for his late-modern time and
its needs, Heidegger rejects the ‘Sein-ology’ of what Heidegger calls “the first
beginning” and its metaphysical teaching of the quest for the being of entities (Sein des
Seiendes), a quest that renders entities as dumb, dark objects devoid of their own
meaningful presence until metaphysical thinking lights them with its idea. Remarkably
similarly, Sheehan’s justification for letting go the Sein-ology of ‘the first’ paradigm of
Heidegger scholarship is that it has, over time, exhausted its explanatory power,
rendering and teaching of Heidegger’s works, the entities of his thought, only a
caricatured look of their meaningful presence.
Heidegger’s seemingly common sensical thought, “the concept of philosophy
changes according to the mode of questioning being,” follows from his critique of
metaphysics as a critique of metaphysics’ mode of questioning being (CP 335/GA65:
424). If education in our late modern age is plighted and in crisis as Heidegger thinks it
is, and if that plight and crisis emerges from metaphysics’ taking as truly true only those
responses to its mode of questioning being that bear the correct representation of being,
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then a corollary for education to Heidegger’s seemingly commonsensical thought would
be “the concept of education changes according to the mode of questioning being.” That
is, the concept of learning, thinking, teaching, even evaluating, changes according to the
mode of questioning being. And indeed, changing the mode of questioning being
becomes Heidegger’s strategy for enacting a radical, comprehensive, ontological
paradigm shift in western philosophy and for ‘overcoming’ the ‘exhaustion’ of the
western philosophical tradition as metaphysics. That exhaustion is evident, Heidegger
argues in Contributions to Philosophy, in the plights and crises of late-modernism,
including the plight and crisis in education and its institutions, activities, and pedagogical
happenings.
The change in questioning that Heidegger teaches in Contributions to Philosophy
is, by the look of it, unremarkable. But it is a sign of the crisis of our late-modern age and
its need that the question of this mode of questioning would not appear question-worthy,
not appear overflowing with possibility for meaningful presencing. The question
Heidegger teaches in Contributions to Philosophy and the question that opens a change in
questioning being is simply, what is beyng (Seyn)? That is the teaching of Heidegger’s
notoriously inscrutable behemoth Contributions to Philosophy; simply said, that is
Heidegger’s contribution—to philosophy, to education, to remedying the withdrawal of
meaningful presence from all entities and phenomena of late-modern life. It is because
we late-modern humans do not know how to ‘take’ such a question, or what—or where—
to make of such a question, that Heidegger must prepare, educate, those among us who
can, to “receive…the intimation and intrusion of the absconding and nearing” of such a
basic, opening question. It is because we late-modern humans do not know how to ‘take’
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such a question that Heidegger’s teaching, his Contributions, is gigantic, as befits the age.
Were we already taught, turned, we would find our way to what is most question-worthy
in the intimations of Heidegger’s question and his teaching would need be only its three
words and interrogative inflection.
It strikes me as fitting that in Making Sense of Heidegger, which Sheehan says is
his capstone work on Heidegger, he appropriates the Kuhnian paradigm shift and its
implicit thematics of deficiency/want, crisis, and need. It is, first of all, fitting in that the
thematic of deficiency/want, crisis, and need runs throughout Heidegger’s entire career of
thought, especially his thinking on education and its concerns. This thematic might seem
unremarkable, given that the movement of human intelligibility within most, if not all,
academic and research disciplines, traditions, and their systems is compelled by
deficiency or want in approach, thinking, or theory, followed by addressing that
deficiency or want to resolve it. However, as this chapter of my study will next consider,
Heidegger makes the thematic of deficiency/want, crisis, and need a matter for both his
thinking and his pedagogical vision. Heidegger shows the thematic of deficiency/want,
crisis, and need to be a dynamic, the force that stimulates change or progress within a
system (including, for Heidegger the change and ‘progress’ that is the overcoming of
systems and the metaphysical ‘need’ to systematize). Further, in bringing forth the
presence of deficiency/want, crisis, need and their dynamic, Heidegger indicates or opens
a thinking site, a ‘clearing’ apart from and, nevertheless, within the system wanting
change and beckons others to that thinking site and calls them to make there what they
would. Sheehan too is opening up a thinking site and opening it, like Heidegger, by
calling for a change in the mode of questioning, from pursuing the ontological in

82

Heidegger’s thought-entities (his work and thought therein) to pursuing the
phenomenological in Heidegger’s thought-entities.96

3.2 The NOT-Structure in Heidegger’s Thinking
Without validating it, Jacques Derrida accepted Heidegger’s decision to become
Nazi Rector, such that Derrida can say in “Mochlos, or the Conflict of the Faculties” that
Heidegger’s much maligned Rectoral Address is “the last great discourse in which the
Western university tries to think its essence and its destination in terms of responsibility
[to being].97 In the summer of 1934 and soon after Heidegger resigned the Freiburg
Rectorship, he taught a lecture course, Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of
Language (GA38), a course initially offered by the title “The State and Science.” At the
beginning of the first class meeting, Heidegger “categorically and demonstratively
announced… ‘I am teaching Logic’—to the surprise and disgruntlement of several NSfunctionaries who had turned up to his lecture” (LQ 144/GA38: 172). The lecture’s tone
is equally disaffected and urgent, even angry, showing Heidegger’s with the university
and its community for failing to act decisively for the “happening of education”
(Erziehungsgeschehen) (LQ 50/GA38: 56). This lecture includes some of Heidegger’s
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more explicit writing on education and is remarkably transitional, showing Heidegger to
be standing in between his failed educational project for the Rectorship—the ontological
reesentializing of the sciences, as Thomson characterizes it—and the radical ontological
education project he lays out in Contributions. It also shows Heidegger to be standing
between conceptual language of Being and Time (“resoluteness”) and that of
Contributions to Philosophy (“event,” “happening”): for example, “Resoluteness is itself
an event, which fore-grasping that happening, constantly co-determines the happening….
Resoluteness is a distinctive event [Geschehnis] in a happening [Geschehen] (LQ
166/GA38: 77). The lecture also shows Heidegger to be standing between the ‘political’
position of the Rectorship and the apolitical, or less political, or private teaching duty he
claimed later was his position after 1934.
Heidegger’s philosophical work on education does continue after his failure as
Rector of Freiburg University, though Jacques Derrida observes in reflection on
Heidegger’s Rectorship, that after Heidegger’s much maligned Rectoral address, “the
enclosure of the university—as a commonplace and powerful contract with the state, with
the public, with knowledge, with metaphysics and technics—will seem to [Heidegger]
less and less capable of measuring up to a more essential responsibility, that
responsibility that… must first answer to being, for the call of being, and must think this
coresponsibility.”98 In an autobiographical remark written in 1945 and included in Die
Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Das Rektorat, Heidegger offers an
autobiographical account from which Derrida’s reflection likely draws:
From 1934 on, I lived outside the university to the extent that I no longer
troubled myself about its ‘proceedings’, but rather attempted merely to
98
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fulfill the most needful teaching duty according to my powers. But in the
following years, teaching was more a self-conversation of essential
thinking with itself. Perhaps, here and there, men were affected and
awakened [getroffen und geweckt], but it did not develop into a nascent
structure of a determinate mode of conduct, from which something
originary could have again sprung [aber es gestaltete sich nicht in ein
werdendes Gefüge eines bestimmten Verhaltens, dem selbst wieder
Ursprüngliches hätte entspringen können] (SU).99
Heidegger critics no doubt find in Heidegger’s account deflection of
accountability for his Nazi involvements, especially in his suggestion that his “attempts”
at that time were “merely” educative, not political, and irreproachably committed to the
“most needful teaching duty according to his powers.” But for a trace of the maudlin,
Heidegger’s account here is corroborated by his work and concerns in the middle period
after 1934. As my study has indicated along the way, a concern and, further, a
fundamental premise for Heidegger during the middle period is that the modern west, and
all that is of it— for example, human beings, their life-worlds and science, philosophy,
education—is in distress (Not). The essence of this distress or plight is, as Heidegger
characterizes it, “abandonment of being” (CP 14ff./GA65: 15ff.).
The German word needful (nötig), as in Heidegger’s “most needful teaching
duty,” derives from the German word for plight (Not). The German Not is usually
translated to English as dire need, distress, and here, in my study, plight.100 The German
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Not resonates fortuitously in English as the English adverb not that both expresses and
forms the negative, and resonates, a bit more cheekily, as the English homophone knot,
which in its senses of the unpleasant feeling of tension (as in a ‘knot in the stomach’) and
of a something difficult to unravel.
As a very initial opening into the meaning of plight for Heidegger, on our way to
considering its significance in Heidegger’s thought, particularly his thinking on
education, plight—as word and as phenomenon—for Heidegger indicates want, danger,
and duty. Plight means want in the sense of being-without and in the sense of dearth, as
both paucity and dearness, for what is lacking or wanting is to be cherished and held near.
Plight means danger as that which threatens not only human well-being but human
essential being as the site where being, the meaningful presencing of entities and
phenomena in their unconcealing (aletheia), happens. And plight means duty as in a call
of duty, a responsibility or “coresponsibility,” as Derrida characterizes it, to heed the call
of plight and, for the sake of human being as a whole, respond. For Heidegger, the
needful—what is needful—is clarified by plight, plight as impoverishment, want, lack,
deficiency. For Heidegger, the needful teaching duty clarified by plight is to prepare
human beings to hearken to plight as plight, to the Not as not, and then to respond
appropriately.
As Heidegger suggests in The Essence of Truth and “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”
without much elaborating, paideia and apaideia—education and not-education—are
dynamic together, one giving way to the other: “paideia is essentially a movement of
passage, from apaideia to paideia (P 166/GA9: 216). What is apaideia in the Cave
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Allegory can compel a movement of passage to paideia, if the plight of apaideia is
thought and its need answered. The deterioration of paideia—education—into plight is
the happening of the alpha-privative, but within Heidegger’s Not-structure.
There is in Heidegger’s entire career of thought what I call a “Not-structure” that
may explain the dynamic relating of paideia and apaideia. Simply said, in Heidegger’s
thinking, the positive (the affirmative, the presence) and the negative (the denial, the
absence) belong together, are dynamic together as the force that stimulates change or
progress within a system. The Not-structure in Heidegger’s thought can be thematized in
a number of ways: as dire need or plight (Not), fallenness (Verfallen), inauthenticity
(Uneigentlichkeit), errancy (Irre), danger (Gefahr), enframing (or the more recent
translation choice but less imagistically and polysemically evocative “positionality”)
[Gestell], forgottenness/ concealment (Verborgenkeit), and apaideia, an especially
concernful plight for Heidegger in the middle period.
As the analytic of Dasein (human being) in Being and Time lays forth, the
dynamics of a human existence—the force that stimulates change or progress—are
“nots,” negatives. In Being and Time, these include fallenness, inauthenticity, and worldcollapse (or the failing or ending of a project or way-of-being-in-the-world). There is, for
Heidegger, disclosive power in the privative: the ultimate “not” in the analytic of Dasein
in Being and Time is, of course, death, and in Heidegger’s analysis, authentic beingtoward-death, the reality of the “not” are compelled to more meaningful being. In the
dynamism of the Not-structure, “it is plight in the compelling toward the necessity of the
highest possibilities, on whose paths human beings, in a creative and grounding way, go
beyond themselves and back into the ground of beings” (CP 38/GA65: 46). And “all
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necessity,” Heidegger thinks in Contributions, is rooted in a plight. Philosophy…has its
necessity in the first and most extreme plight [the forgottenness of plight]…” (CP
37/GA65: 45).
Plight is not only adverse for Heidegger, for deficiencies or absences reveal the
possibility for their opposites to those human beings open to making sense of deficiencies
or absences by means of thinking and questioning. The greatest plight is a lack of a sense
of plight—not realizing plight as plight. Modern erudition and its transmission as
education is a particularly disastrous form of modern plight, because modern erudition
mostly lacks genuine understanding, or even genuine sense, of its own plight. Heidegger
writes, again in Contributions,
The lack of a sense of plight is greatest where self-certainty has become
unsurpassable, where everything is held to be calculable, and especially where it
has been decided, with no previous questioning, who we are and what we are
supposed to do….Where “truth” has long since ceased to be a question…and even
the attempt at such a question is dismissed as a disturbance and inconsequential
musing” (CP 99/GA65: 125).
In Making Sense of Heidegger, Sheehan characterizes Heidegger’s view on the
contemporary world as one of “utter pessimism.”101 This might be true of Heidegger in
the months after the Rectorship (evident in some of the bitter language of GA38, when
Heidegger has not yet seen what Nazi National Socialism would become and thinks that a
National Socialism that educates the Volk society who are the German nation is the right
political movement for the German university and Heidegger’s deep commitment to the
university as the place to answer the needs of the Bildungsfrage), and it may too have
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been true of him during his breakdown after his 1945 banishment from teaching, but
Sheehan’s “utter pessimism” is not a right characterization for an educator of Heidegger’s
stripes. While plight is rife in Contributions to Philosophy, plight is, as Heidegger makes
very clear, necessary for the future need. Throughout the Fugen of Contributions to
Philosophy, Heidegger is not merely ranting or musing in a ‘negative key.’ And as much
as Heidegger might be pessimistic about his contemporary present, he is not so utterly
pessimistic about the future that he isn’t thinking very hard about how to serve that future
need, and more specifically in Contributions to Philosophy, about how to educatively
prepare human beings for it. “Plight," says Heidegger, “must never be taken superficially
and hastily as deficiency, misery, or the like. It stands outside the possibility of all
‘pessimistic’ or ‘optimistic’ evaluation. The basic disposition that disposes toward the
necessity is in each case correlative to the primordial experience of the plight” (CP
37/GA65: 46).
Even in the context of Heidegger’s thought of the historical unfolding of the
western philosophical tradition and its ending; and even in the context of Heidegger’s
thought the “history of being” unfolding toward nihilism and toward the emptying of
beings of their meaningful presence until only beings-as-objects (objects regarded only as
resources useful to production and power) remain; and even in Heidegger’s effort to turn
thinking ‘back’ toward the Greeks and the inception of the western philosophical
tradition as metaphysics, Heidegger’s thinking of contemporary plight is not a
philosophical pessimism that views the progression of time to be more negative than
positive or increasingly negative, leaving behind a ‘golden age.’ Instead, Heidegger’s
engagement with plight is hopeful: it is a stage in an educative movement of passage that
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prepares human beings to leap from nihilism, from the receding of meaningful presence
from our contemporary world (all that is τὰ ὄντα ‘under’ or within metaphysics.).
Is such genuine education and radical restart not only of education but also of the
ways of existing or happenings with which education collaborates—truth, science, arts,
and philosophy as thinking, questioning, teaching, learning—possible? Is such real
education, education that is most needful amidst the modern plight of the withdrawal of
being—meaningful presence—from all aspects of modern life, a plight of withdrawal
Heidegger deems irrevocable, at all possible when such a real education requires
thoughtful, thus beingful, laying hold, turning, leading, and acclimating? Is such
education possible when modern education itself seems irrevocably plighted?
Maybe. And maybe so if an education can first call forth whar Heidegger calls
“transitional thinking,” thinking which Heidegger envisions in his Contributions to be
catalyzed by a pedagogy practiced within and decisive for the western philosophical
tradition: a version of Socratic aporia, the shock of the experience of stultification in
thinking, the shock of one’s ignorance, of the impenetrability of certain philosophical
problems, and the shock that one is not thinking, is unable to answer the call of what is
thought provoking.
To effect that shock and catalyze transitional thinking in his audiences, in the
readership of Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) particularly, an audience more
likely to hold rare “future ones,” humans willing to leap thinking from the first beginning
of western philosophy as metaphysics now plighted with nihilism into the other
beginning of western philosophy as thinking not yet happened or happening. Heidegger
envisions the fundamental contributions of Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) to
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be the event—Ereignis—the happening, of thinking that may lead to the real education
that turns human thinkers out of plighted metaphysical thought and into human learnersas-thinkers-essentially-being within the essential domains of questioning and thinking of
the new beginning. In Contributions he outlines a ground plan “still-unmastered” of “the
temporal-spatial playing field which the history of the transition first creates as its own
realm in order to decide, according to its own law,…about the future ones, i.e. those who
occur only once,” for they are mortal, rare, and unlike the common, customary
metaphysical thinkers ‘educated’ by the turning of Plato’s ‘real education,’ who have
recurred through and throughout the unfolding of the first philosophy as metaphysics, the
future ones occur only once, each unique, its thought burgeoning from within and not
trued to form from without (CP 8/GA65: 7). The Socratic shock of stultification—or the
Heideggerian encounter with plight, with the abandonment of meaningful presence in
human being’s encounters with entities and phenomena—happens on the “playing-field”
that is Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) in the section called “The Resonating”
(Der Anklang). Therein, Heidegger puts forth a shocking catalogue of modern plights and
shocking thinking as meditation on the essence of plight, shocks intended to resonate and
provoke thinking about plight’s stultification and the most needful education-aspreparation to initiate transition to an other philosophical beginning, that leaps from—and
must leap from—the western philosophical tradition’s first philosophy, ontology
practiced as metaphysics.
“The Resonating” is a sizable catalogue of modern plights, notably and especially
focused on plight in education and its concerns. Modern education, Heidegger says, is
preparation for “transition to the technologized animal” (CP 78/GA65: 98). Its resonating
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themes are speed, greatness as massiveness (as mass appeal and gigantic size),
calculability, and human machination, wherein man is measure, maker, and master of all
that is. Universities become “business establishments,” “sites of scientific research and
teaching… [purportedly] ever closer to reality,” but where nothing is originally—that is,
ontologically—questioned or decided (CP 121-22/GA:65 156). The natural sciences
“become components of machine technology and of business”; the human sciences
become newspaper sciences of gigantic scope, interpreting and publishing the current
lived experience as quickly as possible in a form comprehensible to everyone (CP 121/
GA65: 15). Philosophy is understood as “historiological and ‘system’-building erudition”
(CP 122/GA65: 156), modern plight itself is taken superficially to be nihilism, a
symptom of cultural psychology, and in “dread of questioning” and in “ignorance of the
essence of truth…that, prior to everything true, truth and its grounding must be
decided,”// “truth deteriorates into certainty of representation and the security of
calculation and lived experience” (CP 38, 72, 93, 122/GA65: 47, 91, 118, 156).
The essence of plight, as Heidegger sees it in Contributions, can be said rather
simply: the essence of modern plight, Heidegger says in Contributions and elsewhere, is
the abandonment of beings by being/beyng (Sein/Seyn). In other words, the presence of
what genuinely exists (beings, entities, phenomena), and the meaningfulness they bring
forth to humans, is disappearing. Humans as rational subjects, as modern subjective I or
we, thinks Heidegger, increasingly regard what genuinely exists as objects with nothing
inherently, uniquely present or meaningful about them, endowing them instead with
representational concepts or theoretical essences beheld beyond the beings themselves.
So insidious is modern plight that even its meaningful presence is withdrawing,
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disappear, as humans take it “superficially and hastily as deficiency” (CP 37/GA65: 46).
The greatest plight then becomes “the lack of a sense of plight,…greatest,” Heidegger
writes in Contributions, “where ‘truth’ has long since ceased to be a question…and even
the attempt at such a question is dismissed as a disturbance and inconsequential musing”
(CP 99/GA65: 124)
Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) is Heidegger’s ‘untimely
meditation,’ written during the years 1936-38 and, fittingly, during Heidegger’s
Nietzsche period. His stipulation that his untimely meditation be withheld from
publication until the indicates that at its writing, its time had not yet come. What had not
yet arrived is readiness even among few rare philosophical thinkers to think being
transitionally, preparing the way for the real education of future ones.
In 1951-52, Heidegger delivered the lecture series What is Called Thinking? (Was
Heisst Denken?) at Freiburg University, Heidegger’s first teaching lectures at Freiburg
after the reinstatement of his teaching license, which had been revoked in 1946 by the
French military government’s denazification committee. The opening lectures of What is
Called Thinking?, as does “The Resonating” section or ‘joining’ (Fugen) of
Contributions to Philosophy, call their audience into thinking on modern plight,
specifically the plight of not thinking, of not hearkening to what is “most thoughtprovoking in our thought-provoking time…that we are still not thinking (WCT 6/GA8:
9). And it is a call, like that of “The Resonating” of Contributions to Philosophy,
seemingly intended first to identify the stultification of thinking, then to provoke
catalyzing shock, and then further to call his audience toward what is most thoughtprovoking in our thought-provoking time: that we are still not thinking.
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Heidegger’s Contributions calls for education as preparation, again a laying hold
of the essential human being as that which beholds beings and presence, and a
transforming of the formation of human being by education within metaphysics and
educational plight. This educational preparation is Heidegger’s vision for human return to
the place of our essential being as belonging to beings. It is preparation or educational
turning that happens in stages, first the resonating of plight, a recognition of lack, of the
withdrawing of meaningful presence. The second stage is interplay—thinking presence
within the history of the meaningful presence, as one might in the decisive events of great
thinkers’ thinking and questioning, preserved in our great books, great art, great
structures. The third stage is the leap into the abyssal possibility of presence and
meaning, letting go of thinking as forming essential representation, And the fourth is a
collaborative finding and founding, through the truth-event of Ereignis, of presence in
beings overlooked by the conceptualization of metaphysics, metaphysical thinking, and
its position on truth.
Chapter 4 explores this collaborative finding and founding in practice, as paideia
and as Ereignis, in Heidegger’s philosophical dialogue and later work “A Dialogue on
Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” and in Derrida’s vision for an educational
site or place wherein Ereignis may happen, and in St. John’s College, formatively shaped
by Heidegger’s student Jacob Klein.
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4
EREIGNIS IN PRACTICE: HEIDEGGER’S “A DIALOGUE ON
LANGUAGE,” DERRIDA’S KHORA, KLEIN’S ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE

4.1 Heidegger’s Mature Philosophy of Education: Paideia as Poiesis,
Educating as Ereignis
In “Heidegger’s Perfectionist Philosophy of Education In Being and Time,” Iain
Thomson restates one of the important hermeneutic theses of Heidegger on
Ontotheology, that Heidegger “developed and refined his educational views in important
ways between 1911 and 1940, while working toward…his ‘mature’ philosophy of
education first presented in his 1940 article, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” which Thomson
wants insightfully to rename Heidegger’s “Teaching on teaching.”102 While I think it
right that “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” does introduce significant aspects of Heidegger’s
mature vision of ontological education, the pedagogy that leads us to become who we are
as being as Thomson argues, I aim to advance a hermeneutic thesis of my own: that the
‘mature’ philosophy of education we first see in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” is what
Heidegger’s later work “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer”
calls a “construction site” (Baustellen) on the way to a more mature understanding of
education and philosophy, a more mature understanding that we see implicitly in “A
Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer.” “Dialogue on Language”
exemplifies (and performs) Heidegger’s mature teaching on teaching, on learning, and on
education’s interdependent relationship with truth, being, and language.
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“A Dialogue on Language” does not supplant “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” or
negate what “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” discloses of Heidegger’s philosophy of
ontological education. “A Dialogue on Language” does not negate Heidegger’s
hermeneutic thesis in reading Plato’s cave allegory, that education and truth are linked
“together into an original and essential unity” or its speaking what Heidegger takes to be
Plato’s unsaid teaching of “a change in what determines the essence of truth,” or that
“real education lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all
leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it” (P 167/GA9: 218).
Instead of being negated or overturned, I take “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” to be “an earlier
standpoint,” which, as Heidegger says in “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese
and an Inquirer” about an earlier standpoint on hermeneutics taken in Being and Time, he
has left “not in order to exchange it for another one, but because even a former standpoint
was merely a way-station (Aufenthalt) along a way” (OWL 12/GA12: 98). In keeping
with the later Heidegger’s view that “the lasting element in thinking is the way”—and
that what lasts and does not change or get left behind is journeying itself, even if the way
or mode of movement—I want to show that “A Dialogue on Language” is not
Heidegger’s most mature vision of ontological education, but more mature, more fully
realized, than “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” and that in seeing “A Dialogue on Language”
as more mature, we can see more of what Heidegger took to be the way of the kind of
education that is a most significant concern throughout Heidegger’s thinking.
As Thomson shows in Chapter 4 of Heidegger on Ontotheology, Heidegger’s
mature views of education emerge from Heidegger’s leaving behind fundamental
ontology for an understanding of metaphysics as ontotheology, historically successive
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understandings of the being of entities.103 Heidegger’s view in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”
that there can be “a change in what determines the essence of truth” is possible only if
there is no one truth, no one fundamental ontology, but truths, a sequence of fundamental
and ultimate ontological positions—ontotheologies—that determine the essence of truth
for a time and then fall away as another emerges. The essential unity, then, between
education and truth is that education teaches what is true within a given ontotheological
epoch, teaches the essence of truth for that epoch, and has the power to transform
“everything that has heretofore been manifest to human beings, as well as the way in
which it has been manifest (P 168/GA9: 219).
In Chapter 3 of Heidegger on Ontotheology, Thomson shows that Heidegger’s
move from fundamental ontology to epochs of ontotheologies means for education that
Heidegger’s education project would no longer be merely to revitalize universities by
restoring the uni- to the university, bringing its diverse departments and forces to realize
the fundamental ontological project they shared and that all of their teaching and research
disclosed. Instead, as Thomson shows, Heidegger’s move from fundamental ontology to
ontotheology means for Heidegger’s education project that in its mature form it aims to
turn students, making them aware of their age’s ontotheology and its place in the
historical sequence of past ontotheologies. Their education leads and turns them to be
aware that our age’s fundamental conceptual parameters and standards for what is
legitimate will that we are Bestand, resources to be optimized. In this way, “real
education,” that which “lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first
of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it,” leads us to
the place that is the temporal and historical being-here of our age’s ontotheology and
103
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accustoms us to our ontotheology’s fundamental conceptual parameters so we may be
open to the possibility of seeing ourselves as other than resources to be optimized, and
may then be open to realizing other modes of being (P 167/GA9: 218).
Transformation or conversion reflect the Nietzschean aspect of Heidegger’s
educational thought, the aspect that interprets “revolutionary” as polysemic in what
Thomson calls “the revolutionary return of the self to itself…at the very heart of
Heidegger’s mature ontologization of education.”104 Revolutionary is polysemic in the
sense of forcible political overthrow of revolve or roll back, a return to the radical or root
of being; of dramatic change in the way something works or the way people think about
it; and of the completion of a cycle. In one sense, all of these speak to Thomson’s thesis
that Heideggerian education aims to unify us around the project of confronting and
overcoming our ontotheology; and by this same take, Heideggerian education compels a
self-overcoming. This self-overcoming is Nietzschean in character. The language of
transformation, force, and violence in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” and Heidegger’s
emphasis in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” of the “force” mentioned in Plato’s cave allegory
support Thomson’s reading that the ontological education it advances is revolutionary in
a Nietzschean sense of overthrow and overcoming. And it seems right to say that
Heidegger, in 1940, influenced by his reading of Nietzsche, as he would be for the next
decade, was offering in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” his teaching on teaching, a vision of
education influenced by Nietzschean and Platonic/Christian ideas of revolution.
While I think it right to say that Heidegger remains committed to a radical
revision of education throughout his career, and that this radical revision has as part of its
project, an overthrow and roll back, a self-overcoming on the part of human being, or
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human being, so we may return toward the radical or root of being, this is not where
Heidegger’s radical revision alights and rests. And while Heidegger’s practical project
for ontological education includes turning students to make them aware of their age’s
ontotheology and its place in the historical sequence of past ontotheologies, liberating
them from blind acceptance of its shadows of truth, Heidegger’s practical project for
ontological education does not merely graduate its students to return to them to the cave
in order to be optimal teaching resources there or to be enlightened, optimized and
optimizing participants in cave living amidst others who are, and are not, so optimized.
Paul Standish criticizes Thomson’s reading of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” for
failing to offer us understanding of the “dynamism in the stages through which the
learner moves on the path to understanding.”105 But the failing, I’d say, is rightly
Heidegger’s, if not Plato’s. Though Thomson takes "Plato's Doctrine on Truth" as
giving us explicit ways for how such Heidegger’s mature ontological education is to
work, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” remains a description from the outside. In it, we see the
stages meant to be accomplished and reached, but are shown very little about how
transformation from one stage to the next takes place within the student. Though the
narrative that is Plato’s cave allegory and Heidegger’s appropriation of it for “Plato's
Doctrine of Truth” both characterize education as movement or passage through a series
of four stages, each stage depicting and grounded in a different kind of aletheia, a
different kind of unhiddenness or truth that is “normative at each level” and “dominant at
each stage,” both Plato’s account and Heidegger’s appropriation of it remain only
description of this movement. Neither depicts or indicates or explains how pedagogy—
how learning—compels this education’s movement. Neither identifies the force that
105
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compels transformation, or indicates the essence or nature of this force. Though
Heidegger’s account of the allegory does speak a couple of the questions that the
student/prisoner of the cave allegory might be asked in order to think about and realize
the truth of what is, we are not shown, do not hear, the questions that turn; we are not
shown, do not follow, the thinking that turns. Heidegger asks compelling questions to
provoke our thinking about the process of passage and movement—“What happens in
these movements of passage? What makes these events possible? From what do they
derive their necessity? What issue is at stake in these passages?”(P 165/GA9: 216)—but
“Plato's Doctrine of Truth” does not illuminate response to these questions as mature as
the illumination of them that emerges from “A Dialogue on Language: between a
Japanese and an Inquirer.” We do not see inside the classroom of the cave allegory,
really, and we do not see inside its student, do not see the student in thinking, in thought.
We are told that it happens, that it happens is described for us, but we do not see into how
it happens.
By way of introduction to “”A Dialogue on Language,” Heidegger gives the name
“Heidegger” to the Inquirer, the Fragenden, of “A Dialogue on Language: between a
Japanese and an Inquirer,” but in the way that we should hesitate to assume that the
Canterbury Tales character “Chaucer” is the same as its author, Chaucer, we should not
assume that the Fragenden Heidegger and the dialogue’s author, Martin Heidegger, are
the same. Theodore Kisiel, in “Heidegger’s Apology” (Heidegger’s Way of Thought),
calls “A Dialogue on Language” “quasi-fictional,” noting that while the reminiscences of
the Inquirer, “Heidegger,” that open the dialogue appear to draw from the facts of the
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author, Heidegger’s, biography, these reminiscences are not wholly factual.106 For
example, Kisiel says, the biographical excursus that “yields the central fictionalized ‘fact’
which introduces the central concepts that govern the entire dialog” was not a part of the
conversation between Heidegger and Tomio Tezuka, on which “A Dialogue on
Language” is based. Kisiel views the dialogue’s “Heidegger” to be the same as the
author, Heidegger, and sees their conflation as part of Heidegger’s strategy for
autobiographical revisionism, for guiding his philosophical biography. Kisiel says,
“clearly then, Heidegger is construing his own biographical facts in order to guide the
line of thought he wishes to pursue in this dialogue. Call it what you will—irony, poetic
license or whimsical playfulness—this play between fact and fiction, this creative use of
biography to promote thought, suggests a whole host of structural parallels and
exchanges (Germany/Japan, West/East…teacher (grown old)/student (died young)….”107
While I agree with Kisiel that Heidegger is appropriating and manipulating his
own biography to guide the line of thought in the dialogue, Kisiel views this
manipulation to be more insidiously self-interested than I do. In a reading probably now
outdated, Kisiel takes the line that “A Dialogue on Language” is a “major
autobiographical statement” and that Heidegger practices “autobiographical slanting” in
the dialogue, construing his own biographical facts less to serve the truth of thought,
thinking, and being than to serve with self-interest his reputation and image. Kisiel’s
interpretation seems to me too cynical.108 It eclipses the richness of the creative use of
biography to promote thought in the dialogue. While I think it true that as Heidegger’s
career advances, Heidegger is plenty aware of his work as a whole body of thought and is
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aware that any work added shapes the whole as whole thought, such that he crafts its
additions carefully and purposefully, I do not think it right to suggest that the dialogue’s
purpose is especially to make autobiographical statement or revision. Even if the revision
aims purposefully to suggest that the later Heidegger’s concentration on language was
present in the Heidegger’s early work in a way that serves Heidegger’s thinking on
language and is conveyance, rather than the revision serving to offer defensive “apology”
for Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism” as Kisiel suggests, autobiographical
revision is but a sidecar to the dialogue as vehicle for thought. “A Dialogue on Language:
between a Japanese and an Inquirer” is mainly a thinking on language, and offers, as I
will emphasize, as one of its significant purposes, a thinking and example of how
language conveys and conducts learning.
“A Dialogue on Language: between a Japanese and an Inquirer” offers a
phenomenology of how ontological education happens, from the inside. It shows step-bystep, and stage-by-stage, question-by-question, response-by-response, thought and
thinking by thought and thinking, the transformation of the two learners, the “Inquirer”
(Fragenden) and the Japanese, as they engage in genuine research into the essence of
language. The dialogue is richly and deeply polysemic. It is poetry, it is educational
phenomenology, and it is many kinds of theory—aesthetic, ontological, epistemological,
metaphysical, linguistic, hermeneutic, historical, educational. Its polysemic purpose may
even include, as Theodore Kisiel says, autobiographical slanting and revision, as part of
Heidegger’s effort to direct his reputation and legacy and repair his notorious disloyalty
to Husserl.
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In its opening, the “Dialogue” reverses the ordinary order of student honoring
teacher and teaching deserving more honor than the student’s learning, when as its first
insight of memorable reflection it observes, via the Japanese’s remark, that Kuki’s
teacher spent a year writing an epitaph of “supreme tribute” to his student. The Japanese
also notes that Kuki studied also with the Fragenden, “Heidegger.” With this opening,
Heidegger establishes one of the principles of his mature vision for education, that the
teacher be a learner, “the teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the
apprentices,” and if “the relation between the teacher and the taught is genuine, therefore,
there is never a place in it for the authority of the know-it-all of the authoritative sway of
the official” (WCT 15/GA8: 18). The pedagogical relation in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”
is one of authoritative sway, “force.” The pedagogical relation in “A Dialogue on
Language” is one of mutual, interdependent questioning. Though the Fragenden takes the
lead in the questioning initially, and seems then to be in the position of teacher, he is, as
Heidegger says of the teacher in What is Called Thinking?, “far less assured of his ground
than those who learn are of theirs,” because the Japanese knows about the ‘luminous
presence’ of Japanese art, for which the Fragenden’s aesthetic concepts, which would
afford him the scholarly, the metaphysical mastery of a teacher’s knowledge, authority,
and upper hand, are useless (WCT 15/GA8: 18). Halfway through the dialogue, the
Japanese asks the questions, becomes the questioner, the Fragenden, so that even in their
nominal distinction, the place of questioner or teacher, learner or listener, is not
authoritatively certain. One is not transforming, attuning, or turning the other, as is true of
Heidegger’s early philosophic pedagogy and the pedagogy of “Plato's Doctrine of Truth”;
instead, they come to transform, attune, and turn one another.
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This reciprocal turning is a mark of Ereignis and, then, Heidegger’s more mature
educational vision. The later Heidegger includes this reciprocal turning as one of the
meanings for his polysemic and crucial term, Ereignis. Ereignis is a reciprocal relation:
phenomenological presence (which may include other human being or texts or ideas, in
addition to phenomena of the physical world) is available for human being to engage with
and make intelligible, and phenomenological presence is meaningfully present and
intelligible because human being makes it so.109 Heidegger terms the dynamic of this
reciprocity as Kehre, a “turn,” to emphasize the dynamic forces of appeals, inclinations,
engagement, and withdrawal between human being and presencings. Ereignis is the
opening of a “clearing,” for Heidegger in which entities can appear as this or that,
because of the turn operative in Ereignis. This turn is the back and forth, give and take,
reciprocity of the relationship of phenomenological presencing and human being. This
back and forth reciprocity, this place of Ereignis, is a mark of Heidegger’s more mature
educational vision.
In Introduction to Metaphysics—from 1935 and of the stage in Heidegger’s
education thought that includes Contributions to Philosophy and “Plato's Doctrine of
Truth”—Heidegger approaches, by means of an image, an aspect of what happens in the
happening of Ereignis. The image of a back and forth reciprocity is akin to the violent
back and forth of a human craft (human being) pressing into the sea’s (beyng) unrelenting
swell and roil (myriad phenomena, which again may include other Dasein, texts, or
ideas). The sea is there to be ridden, broken into, and survived and man exists to enter on
to it. The sea gives itself in awful, violent swell and sway; the man takes, does violence to
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the sea, by breaking in, laying hold, laying claim. The sea gives to be taken; man takes in
order to offer a take on the given, a taking, a logos, that gives form and meaning to the
given sway. The give and take is sometimes less violent, when man’s craft rides into the
swell with relative ease, because the craft is appropriately strong and the sea fits it, but is
terribly violent when the sea overwhelms man’s craft, swamping it, busting it up, proving
it foolish or when man’s craft “disturbs the calm of growth, the nourishing and enduring
of the tireless one” (IM 164/GA40: 118). There is much here to be explored. The
reciprocity in Introduction to Metaphysics (1935) is palpably violent, revolutionary in
tone, a violence echoed in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” in the “force” compelling the
liberated prisoner into the light outside the cave, light painful because his eyes are not
accustomed to it, and ‘violence’ as strife in the tension between apaideia and paideia,
where Heidegger’s educational philosophy is not yet most mature.110 Strife,
confrontation, Heidegger shows in Introduction to Metaphysics, “Plato's Doctrine of
Truth,” and in later works such as the essays of On the Way to Language and Poetry,
Language, and Thought is vital to Ereignis, ontological turning, and to the later
Heidegger’s poietic thought, but the vital violence of the later Heidegger is less palpably
violent in the conventional sense, is less conventionally revolutionary in tone or action.
Its violence and revolution have overcome conventional violence and revolution, have
overcome Nietzschean self-overcoming, have overcome conventional politics and
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politicizings and moved toward an apolitical polis, place. A mark of Heidegger’s more
mature education thought is that ontological education takes place through gentle
violence, apoliticized revolution, in a political situation.
The Japanese of “A Dialogue on Language” might call this violence “gracious”—
gracious violence—as he comes to Koto—Koto ba, the Japanese word for language—in
the progress of his conversation with the Fragenden. Koto is “the source from which the
mutual interplay of the two comes to pass”; it is “the happening of the lighting message
of the graciousness that brings forth” (OWL47/GA12:144). Language, reckonings,
accounts, intelligibilities—which in its purest forms are poetries—are the petals that stem
from Ereignis. The making of language, reckonings, accounts, intelligibilities, poetries is
poiesis. Their making in the reciprocal ontological dialogue and learning and teaching
that is “A Dialogue on Language” is philosophizing as ontological educating as poietic
education, which I take to be Heidegger’s most mature educational vision. The problem
of how to begin in this poietic education—the problem of its beginning—is resolved in
the dialogue’s showing from the inside, from inside the practice of this education, how it
begins, happens, continues.
Beginning with its commemoration of Kuki, the great meditator on Iki, and
evocation of his death as reminder of the human inevitability of not-being, and then the
attunement of its mood, “A Dialogue on Language” depicts and performs a paradigm for
the memorial and meditative thinking that the mature Heidegger puts forth as the way for
ontological transformation, a thinking activity that is, then, ontological education. In
beginning with Kuki’s death (and its ending Kuki’s living mediations on iki), Heidegger
reminds us, those who will sit with and between the dialogue’s interlocutors, that the vital
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violence present in Kehre that is Ereignis—gentle but no less vital in the mature
Heidegger—can cease: “there is only one thing against which all violence-doing directly
shatters, that is death. Here there is no breaking forth and breaking up, no capturing and
subjugating. (IM 168-9/GA40: 121). Death too is vital to die Kehre, Ereignis, and
ontological education. Heidegger says in “Memorial Address,” which also begins in
memorial thinking (though far less evocatively, and with less powerful transformative
results), paraphrasing the poet Heber: “what the poet means to say: For a truly joyous and
salutary human work to flourish, man must be able to mount from the depth of his home
ground to the ether” (DT 47/GA16: 521). The Fragenden and the Japanese evoke,
without naming it in their memorial thinking of Kuki, both the earth of the home ground
where he lies in death and death itself. From the depth of this ground shared together as
their conversation begins, they will mount to the ether of ontological transformation
through thought thinking. Learning, they will approach together the essence of language,
and Being, and the relation between language and Being, which the Fragenden says was
“veiled and inaccessible” to him as a young theologian (OWL 10/GA12: 97).
Their opening question is whether or not European aesthetics—a polysemic
indicator of a systemic, conceptual metaphysics, cheekily rendered as “artful concepts”—
is suitable to give higher clarity to iki?111 They might as well be asking—and in other
words they are—whether or not, metaphysics can give higher clarity to Being, or, in other
words still, whether or not logos can give clarity to Being. What’s at stake in this
question for the interlocutors is iki-logical or ontological understanding. What they seek
from one another is iki- and onto- logical learning and iki- and onto- logical education.
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Along the way, inquiring into iki and into Being, whether these are or are not two names
for the same. What is at stake includes their leading one another to each be able to make
intelligible the essence of iki, which requires of them to also make intelligible the essence
of language, which also requires of them to make intelligible the essence of truth, which
also requires them to make intelligible the essential way of leading one another to these
intelligibilities, and so to make intelligible also the essence of education (P 167/GA9:
217). As Thomson rightly says, in identifying ontological education as “[laying] hold of
the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our
essential being and accustoming us to it,” what is at stake, and what emerges, are our
essential beings themselves.
In What is Called Thinking? (1954), and Heidegger’s most explicit mature work
on education), Heidegger writes, “To learn means to make everything we do answer to
whatever essentials address themselves to us at a given moment” (WCT 14/GA8: 17).
This saying echoes Heidegger’s understanding of Ereignis; it seems a variation on a
theme. Learning is correlate to, if not the same as, Ereignis. Learning is opening to
answering the essentials that present themselves; Ereignis is the opening of human being
to answer the phenomenological presencings that present themselves. Answering is
making intelligible, is responding to the essential given with a take, an answer. Crucial to
this answering in learning is that it not be static, that it not be a mode of answering which
closes off learning, closes off the address of the essentials, for if answers answer, in the
conventional sense, so as to end or resolve inquiry, the essentials’ address is no longer
heard. From the opening of “A Dialogue on Language: between a Japanese and an
Inquirer” in its recognition of Kuki’s death, through its unfolding opening of its
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philosophizing inquiry into and through iki, language, Being, hermeneutics, and man, the
Japanese and the Fragenden learn by a practice that means to make everything they do
answer to whatever essentials address themselves to them at a given moment in the
dialogue. Their exchange together addresses, questions, and answers these essentials.
There is in this mode of answering, as there is in human being’s making
intelligible the phenomenological presencing in Ereignis, a need for incompleteness,
imperfection, or more pointedly, a need to own—to own up to—the fact that when human
being answers, the phenomenological presencing—the essentials—continue to address
themselves, to presence, to human being, if—and this is a crucial if—human being
answers or makes intelligible the essentials so as to prevent learning from stopping. If
anyone in the dialogue merely answers, and closes the opening that is Ereignis, the
making—the poiesis—that is the making intelligible, the ontological learning, the
ontological education ceases. Perfecting—or bringing to fullness—human being in
Ereignis and poiesis requires a learning, or we might say an education, that would not
perfect in the sense held commonly philosophical perfectionist philosophy since Plato.112
Such an education would aim to imperfect, or better said, to enown the imperfection, the
incompleteness, of human being answering or making intelligible the essentials of
phenomenological presencing. The Japanese acknowledges something of this later in the
dialogue after he and the Fragenden have together made intelligible that hermeneutics
and language belong together to bring about a transformation of thinking, that “the
transformation that occurs as a passage…in which one site is left behind in favor of
another…and that requires that the sites be placed in discussion. One site is metaphysics.
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The other they will leave unnamed” (OWL 42/GA12: 138). Jacques Derrida realizes an
image, and then a name, for such an other site: khôra.

4. 2 Derrida’s Khôra
On the occasion of the inauguration of a doctoral program in philosophy at
Villanova University, Derrida spoke of his own “struggle to enlarge the space for
philosophical teaching and philosophical research.”113 Derrida has in mind enlarging
space for a particular kind of place and happening. I take this place, which Derrida names
khôra, to be Derrida’s version (and revision) of Heidegger’s open clearing (Lichtung), an
image and a place that Heidegger associates with paideia and pedagogy and its
happening, most explicitly in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” This place, khôra for Derrida,
is the place where discourse can happen, where new returns to the origins take place,
where new and replacement names and sayings are lodged, and where the responsibility
both to keep and to renew flourishes. This place, Derrida writes, “gives place to all the
stories, ontologic or mythic, that can be recounted on the subject of what she receives and
even of what she resembles but which in fact take place within her.”114 These qualities
are the ones Derrida wants for education and his university project, such that we might
say of the university as Derrida says of Socrates in his essay, “Khôra,” that the university,
like Socrates, “is not khôra, but…would look a lot like it/her if it/she were someone or
something.”115 Khôra is, for Derrida, “not just a place among others, but perhaps place
itself, the irreplaceable place. Irreplaceable and unplaceable place from which he [a
student, perhaps] receives the word(s) of those before whom he effaces himself but who
113
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receive them from him, for it is he who makes them talk like this.”116 Socrates is
Heidegger’s “purest thinker of the West” and, we may assume, one of the purest
instantiations of human being (WCT 17/GA8: 21). In such a place for the later Heidegger
happens Ereignis, or event. Where there is Ereignis, the myriad and human being (as
student or not) confront one another, giving presencings and taking intelligibility. Where
there is Ereignis, human being in its fullness, maturely educated, is completely open,
opening, and receptive engagement with all phenomenological presencing in its
environment. As Socrates is such a place, as Heidegger’s human being, truly and
maturely educated, is such a place, so, intends Derrida, following the later Heidegger, can
be the university, and its classes, and its community of learners, such a place.
Like Heidegger, Derrida resists that philosophical discourse proceed by the
ordering and structure of such rational binaries as “sense/intelligible,” “logos/mythos,”
“being/nonbeing,” “subject/object,” “ontology/theology,” “thesis/antithesis” or any of the
oppositional pairs familiar within philosophical tradition. Like Heidegger, he aims for
there to be a place where there can be the disorder of a third alongside these oppositional
pairings or can be the insertion of a third into the middle of these oppositional pairings so
as to put them into question. Derrida wants his khôra to be that “place…which disturbs
and undermines any system, all the couples of opposition which constitute a system.” 117
Not repeating the given institution—not self-affirming by repetition—not
repeating specifically the university structure that gives or withholds place to philosophy
as research, writing, and teaching is Derrida’s political and pedagogical project, the one
we could say, as Derrida does, “runs through all my works and all my politico-
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institutional engagements.”118 Not repeating the given philosophical institution also
means, for Derrida, not repeating the mistakes of Heidegger at Freiburg, where
Heidegger allowed the temptation of a totalizing logos—fundamental ontology—and the
opportunity for such a logos to structure a university’s discipline, research, and teaching
to compel him toward an untenable and terrible philosophical mistake, political mistake,
and pedagogical mistake. For Derrida, as for the early Heidegger, philosophy, politics,
and pedagogy come together in his educational thought and practice. All of Derrida’s
writings, including those on educational themes, pulse with political language, purpose,
and positions. In educational writings, his taken position is often more administrative,
more mission commander, more political negotiator, than teacher. In the 1987 interview
“Negotiations,” Derrida says that it is important “now even more than ever,” to
“negotiate a relation—which I call, for convenience and brevity’s sake, deconstructive—
to put philosophy in a philosophical place but also a place where philosophy will be put
into question.”119
By way of conclusion, I will suggest in the next section that we can find such an
irreplaceable place exemplified in St. John’s College, located rather ironically in
America. Heidegger thought America to be an intellectual youngster and the place that
most unequivocally instantiated what Heidegger took to be the “danger” of late-modern
life. Heidegger saw America as bereft of history and a nation of mostly uncultivated
people unified by the conquering capitalism, technology, machinations, size, and “Jewish
rootlessness” that was unearthing the world. But Heidegger mistook that in the
uninterrupted American political tradition of freedom and equality there was the
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possibility for openness, for the very meaningful clearing that Heidegger’s mature
thinking on education realizes is human being’s essential being-at-work.

4.3 Jacob Klein’s Ontological Seminary
Why bring St. John's College into a study of Heidegger? For many reasons, one of
which is the intersection and divergence of Heidegger and the formative dean and tutor of
St. John's, Jacob Klein. Klein and Heidegger shared significant intellectual rootstock as
students and contemporaries at the universities of Freiburg and Marburg in the 1910s and
1920s. Their intersection was quite literal in the middle 1920s, when Klein regularly
attended Heidegger’s lectures on Ancient Greek Philosophy, Aristotle, the question of
truth, and human beings’ a priori need to make sense or meaning. Klein’s friend Leo
Strauss, who also attended Heidegger’s lectures, wrote later of himself and Klein,
“Nothing affected us as profoundly in the years in which our minds took their lasting
directions as the thought of Heidegger.”120 I wonder about the ‘lasting directions’ taken
by Jacob Klein’s mind from the thought of Heidegger, even though Heidegger’s and
Klein’s individual trajectories in philosophical education are astonishingly different.
Leo Strauss offers some insight into what may be an aspect of the lasting direction
taken by Klein from Heidegger. Praising young Klein’s intellectual independence, unique
among the young people of Marburg who were “completely overwhelmed by
Heidegger,” Strauss writes, “Klein alone saw why Heidegger is truly important: by
uprooting and not simply rejecting the tradition of philosophy, [Heidegger] made it
possible for the first time after many centuries—one hesitates to say how many—to see
the roots of the tradition as they are and thus perhaps to know what so many merely
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believe, that these roots are the only natural and healthy roots…. [Klein] was thus
compelled to disinter the roots, to bring them to light, to look at them with wonder.” We
see in Strauss’ metaphor of root—and in the portrait of Klein it illuminates—an image of
liberal learning practiced and lived as radical inquiry, liberal because open to wonder and
thinking; liberal because free to question the inherited tradition and its experts; and
radical because its questioning goes to origins, to what is fundamental, in the ongoing
human project of making sense or meaning of our worlds.
After Marburg Heidegger and Klein diverged substantially. Heidegger went to
Freiburg and its Rectorship; Klein went to America and appointments as tutor and dean at
St. John's College. I see them diverging on collateral paths in philosophical education.
Heidegger, teaching as professing through lecture in a German research university,
guarding a legacy of written work, much of it for education or on education, explicitly or
implicitly; and Klein, teaching as tutoring through conversation in an American liberal
arts college, seemingly indifferent to the legacy of his few but substantial written works,
but passionately committed to his mostly unwritten work for education and on education
at St. John’s. Both Heidegger and Klein accepted opportunities to lead and shape their
respective educational institutions, pursuing in practice their thinking about education.
Heidegger failed notoriously; Klein succeeded eminently. Heidegger’s philosophical
work for education was confined to theoretical written work and lecture after his failure
in practice at Freiburg in 1933, while Klein’s flourished in practice and dialectical
learning at St. John's as Klein “remade the school in his image,” apparently including the
senses of liberal learning as radical inquiry indicated in Strauss’s image of the root.121
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The different shapes of Klein’s and Heidegger’s philosophical work for education
and human being juxtapose evocatively: Klein wrote more than Socrates but far less than
Heidegger. The legacy Heidegger defended to a fault, perhaps, was his written work,
including written records of his teaching lectures. Failed in practice, Heidegger’s
understandings on liberal education are mostly theoretical, explicitly and implicitly
recorded in his sizable body of written work. Successful in practice, Klein’s
understandings on liberal education are, for the most part, recorded in practice, and in the
college, its program and ways of liberal learning, and its community of liberal learners,
present and emeritus. Diverging but collateral—Heidegger theorizing in his hut on the
Todtnauberg earth, Klein shaping liberal education and liberal learning in practice at the
American St. John's College—worlds away, yet in moments uncannily consonant.122 Both
accept the premise that liberal education is good for overcoming the plights of latemodernism, and both understand liberal education as preparation for and practice of
radical inquiry and liberal learning.
Klein took lasting directions from Heidegger, I imagine these directions have
branched innumerably, added to and redirected by Klein’s own wonderings and his
colleagues and students at his college. Nevertheless, we may see growth rings that echo
Heidegger—or not. It is possible to see an interesting interplay between Klein’s college
and Heidegger’s thinking on education, such that both may be seen to be thinking what is
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unthought in the other’s thought—if we may take the college’s community as a thinker
manifesting its thought its practice of liberal education and liberal learning.
Hannah Arendt said that people followed Heidegger “in order to learn
thinking.”123 What Jacob Klein, Heidegger’s student at Marburg in the middle 1920’s, set
up at St. John's College was a site, a place, where people learn thinking, where thinking is
practiced by its quietly self-characterized “community of learners,” and where, as J.
Glenn Gray described Heidegger’s view, “questioning and thinking are not a means to an
end; they are self-justifying.”124 Heidegger’s most mature vision for educational
institution was for a space and place I am tempted to call ontological seminary, which
practices a pedagogy that plants the seeds of ontological paideia in a small clearing
promising deep ground, a place of ontological education. St. John's College is an
ontological seminary, realizing Heidegger’s mature vision for education. Perhaps, as
Heidegger’s mature vision for education would entail, through Ereignis in its ways of
practice, St. John's College has extended and developed Heidegger’s mature vision,
maturing it further.
Leo Strauss, who shared a lifelong friendship with Jacob Klein that began before
they heard together Heidegger lecture at Marburg and lasted until Strauss’s death, wrote
in a tribute to Klein intended to be spoken before Strauss delivered a lecture at St. John’s,
bits of which I have quoted above:
Nothing affected us as profoundly in the years in which our minds took
their lasting directions as the thought of Heidegger. This is not the place
for speaking of that thought and its effects in general. Only this much must

123
124

See Hannah Arendt. “Martin Heidegger At Eighty,” 297.
See J. Glenn Gray, “Introduction” in Martin Heidegger’s What is Called Thinking?, xiii.

116

be said: Heidegger, who surpasses in speculative intelligence all his
contemporaries and is at the same time intellectually the counterpart of
what Hitler was politically, attempts to go a way not yet trodden by
anyone, or rather to think in a way in which certain philosophers at any
rate have never thought before. Certain it is that no one has questioned
the premises of philosophy as radically as Heidegger. While everyone else
in the young generation who had ears to hear was either completely
overwhelmed by Heidegger, or else, having been completely overwhelmed
by him, engaged in well-intentioned but ineffective rear-guard actions
against him, Klein alone saw why Heidegger is truly important: by
uprooting and not simply rejecting the tradition of philosophy, he made it
possible for the first time after many centuries—one hesitates to say how
many—to see the roots of the tradition as they are and thus perhaps to
know what so many merely believe, that these roots are the only natural
and healthy roots….he was thus compelled to disinter the roots, to bring
them to light, to look at them with wonder. Klein was the first to
understand the possibility which Heidegger had opened without intending
it: the possibility of a genuine return to classical philosophy, to the
philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, a return with open eyes and in full
clarity about the infinite difficulties which it entails. He [Klein] turned to
the study of classical philosophy with a devotion and a love of toil, a
penetration and an intelligence, an intellectual probity in which no
contemporary equals him [italics mine].”125
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I quote Strauss at length because in its entirety it confirms Heidegger’s influence
on his students, and his “profound” influence on Klein, without Klein’s “being
overwhelmed,” which I take to mean without Klein’s losing his ability to see beyond
Heidegger as a teacher, think beyond Heidegger as a teacher, or to know his own mind
and pursue his own way, even as he took Heidegger’s teachings with him. Though
Strauss may be praising Klein’s bringing about “a genuine return to classical philosophy”
at St. John’s for how that return might fit Strauss’s agendas, he also conveys Klein’s
unusual stand as Heidegger’s student, and as learner, thinker, and educator. Strauss
confirms that the radical in Heidegger’s approach to the tradition of philosophy, to its
practice as philosophizing, and to its teaching as philosophizing, is both literal and
profound. He confirms that Klein understood this and that Klein may have understood
more about radical education than even Heidegger himself.
Klein’s shaping influence on St. John's College was decisive. Seth Benardete,
whose first academic job was at St. John’s—hired by Klein—said, “it was amazing the
way Klein remade the school in his image. It already had a great books program, based
on the influence of Thomism…. But when Klein came he told them what the program
meant.”126 Though Stringfellow Barr and Scott Buchanan, two followers of Robert
Hutchins, initiated a Great Books Program at St. John’s in 1937, it was Jacob Klein who
brought the college into its essential being and made it, unfolding its ethos, its particular
ways of practice, and its curricular program. St. John’s still respectfully acknowledges its

statement to Klein on April 7, 1960. Strauss had written it in honor of Klein’s sixtieth birthday and
intended to deliver it as spoken prologue to Strauss’s lecture at St. John’s in 1960. The editor of
Strauss’s book, Jewish Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, speculates that the tribute was not
spoken “due to the urgent and specific request of Klein, who suffered from an ‘idiosyncratic [that is,
extreme] abhorrence of publicity’” (451, n.1).
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Great Books origins, but the college has long outgrown those origins and stands far from
Mortimer Adler’s Great Books enterprises and its kin at the College of University of
Chicago and the Core Curriculum at Columbia University.
Adler’s Great Books enterprises aim to make the books and ideas designated as
“great” palatable and pat for the general citizenry (to transform Heidegger’s “das Man”
to no longer be an unthinking herd or public). We might even go so far as to say that
Adler’s “Great Books” is a brand, an enterprise, a marketing vehicle, for it lends its
trademark to many publishing, pedagogical, and lifestyle products. “Greatness” itself is
then branded, harnessed as a resource to be optimized in the marketplace. St. John’s
College, by contrast, ‘brands’ and markets itself very reluctantly and very judiciously,
refusing for example to participate in U.S. News and World Report’s college rankings.
(For much of the past decade, St. John's College was the first ‘ranked’ college to stand
against this process by denying information to U.S. News and World Report.) The books
the college considers great are resources and sources, but resources and sources for
conversation not consumption, for the books are the college’s “most important
teachers…timeless and timely,” expressing “most originally and often most perfectly the
ideas by which contemporary life is knowingly and unknowingly governed”127
For Adler, “The Great Books” yield what he designated “The Great Ideas,” and
these—significantly—are for Adler exhaustible. “It was Adler,” says the preface to
Adler’s book The Great Ideas, “who first understood that there are a limited number of
Great Ideas which form the core of the thought of Western Civilization and the keys to
the Great Books.”128 At St. John’s College, there is no designated set of great ideas and
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no fixed or branded set of “Great Books.” Instead, greatness is characterized by
inexhaustibility as question-worthiness, elucidating power, and meaningful presence. Eva
Brann, Jacob Klein’s colleague, the college’s former dean, and the most perspicuous
reporter on the pedagogical practice of the college Klein so influenced, writes,
“‘greatness’ has real significance for us….Greatness shows up as inexhaustibility.”129
Along with being ‘no-thing’—that is, not an entity, an essential characteristic of
being/beyng (Sein/Seyn), for Heidegger is inexhaustibility: being shows up as
inexhaustible. Further, the college teaches and practices lingering in inexhaustibility—
“pedagogical lingering,” Brann calls it—particularly lingering in the inexhaustibility of
the books. The books read by all and in learning community at St. John’s College are an
inexhaustible source of the matters (Sachen) of concern among the college’s community.
The books’ being (Sein), their meaning as books, unfolds and unconceals in time spent
with them, living with them, lingering in encounter with them, or in Heidegger-speak,
‘dwelling’ with them. In this way the books, as inexhaustible source of matters, are
analogous to Heidegger’s inexhaustible being/beyng (Sein/Seyn).
St. John's College was more a “Great Books” school in the Adler sense during the
first decade of the New Program (roughly 1937-1947), when Adler’s lifelong friend from
University of Chicago, Scott Buchanan was the college dean and pedagogical leader.
Adler and Buchanan shared fundamental educational principles—such as the belief that
education should be democratic and practical in preparing students for active
participation in democratic citizenship. In keeping with these principles, the mission of
the college during that first decade, like that of Adler’s later pedagogical projects (for
example, Paideia Program and the Great Books Foundation), was to bring liberal
129
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education to the many and common man. During the first decade of the New Program,
the pedagogical principles, method, tools, and goals of the college were similar to those
Adler would continue to advocate in his “Great Books” pedagogical projects. Adler later
advocated a method, sometimes called a “Socratic method,” and viewed the Great Books
and the Great Ideas that he canonized to be both the matter worked upon by this method
and the tools by which it worked. Adler represented his method and his pedagogy as a
technē; he does so explicitly in his book The Paideia Program. Adler’s take on greatness
is that greatness—greatness of book or idea—is a resource to be harnessed for the
practical goal of bringing so-called liberal education to the masses. “Greatness,”
interestingly, is not a “Great Idea.”
When Heidegger’s student Jacob Klein became the dean of St. John's College in
1949, Klein, as Seth Benardete remarked, told the college what the college program
“meant.” Eva Brann observes that Klein effected a second founding of the New Program,
“placing under the inspiredly practical Program a philosophical grounding” and leading
the college to reflect more radically on its practices and principles and terms of
engagement than it had under the “Great Books” leadership of Buchanan and Chicagoans
such as Adler.130 She said further of Klein, “His spirit informed the college. While dean,
he was a fierce defender of his conception of this remarkable community of learning.”131
“Greatness,” for example, was no longer an answer but became a question to be asked
and lived in the college community. Pedagogical method was no longer patly described
as “Socratic” and was not considered technē. “Whatever it is we do,” writes Eva Brann,
“it’s not according to any method. A method is, properly, a rule-governed process, and
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we adhere to none such. And it isn’t Socratic….The reason our teaching is not a method
is that it’s just a bit of nature. We do what comes naturally: encourage people by asking
(everyone here knows that you can’t ‘teach people to think’; such taught thinking is just
simulacrum of thought, rule-driven reason.”132 Whatever the college does in its
conversation with greatness, it is not Adlerian technē and it is not to optimize, exhaust, or
market that greatness. The college makes of these great books, as Ehrmantraut says of
Heidegger’s “identification of the will to know with the demand for ‘experience’” as
“living philosophy,” a “seeking to experience what is ‘great.’ ‘Greatness’ is conjoined
with the ‘essential.’”133
It is ironic that, given Heidegger’s disdain for America, Heidegger’s vision for
education may have left Germany with his student Klein as its carrier, been laid in and
established at St. John’s College, Annapolis, under Klein’s watch, and fostered carefully
by others after Klein to flourish according to the ways, principles, and poeisis he guided.
This flourishing includes refinement of what Klein shaped, for the college’s way is a
living philosophizing and its program is a living program, even as it is ever safeguarding
and mindful of its radical traditions What’s further remarkable is that Klein, fleeing the
Nazis, left Germany in the mid-1930’s and left access to much of Heidegger’s middle and
later work, including Heidegger’s more mature educational thought, yet the college Klein
shaped instantiates and developed, found its own way to, the dialectical poiesis in
education that I take to be Heidegger’s most mature vision for education.
The St. John’s seminar, for example, as the college’s “Statement of Program”
carefully articulates, is the “heart” of the St. John’s program and pedagogical ways.
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“Heart” is here to be taken commonly, even in the approachable hackneyed sense, but is
also meant to be considered further, calling forth the question of what means “heart,” and
thinking and conversation about it. In the thinking and conversation of the seminar,
all opinions must be heard and explored, however they may sharply
clash;…[and] every opinion must be supported by an argument—an
unsupported opinion does not count. [Beginners] may tend to express their
opinions with little regard for their relevance to the question or their
relation to the opinions of others. Gradually, in their interplay with one
another, the students learn to proceed with care…. The progress of the
seminar is not particularly smooth; the discussion may sometimes branch
off and entangle itself in irrelevant difficulties. Only gradually can the
logical rigor of an argument emerge within the sequence of analogies and
other imaginative devices by which the discussion is kept alive.134
This statement might describe seminar pedagogy in general, might be declared by
any one of a number of liberal arts colleges or universities as their purported practiced,
and it could be said to describe a Socratic dialogue or conversation, or even a
Heideggerian dialogue, such as “A Dialogue on Language” or the three dialogues written
in 1944-45 and collected as Country Path Conversations (GA77). However, as anyone,
learner or teacher knows, there is an awful difference between what happens commonly
in seminar classrooms of most colleges and universities and in a Socratic dialogue’s
conversation, and there is a marvelous difference between the empty lip-service to such a
statement and the truly meaningful presencing of it that happens at St. John’s. As its
community of learners and practice re-ontologize “heart,” call forth the sense of that
134
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word in its especially meaningful senses, so does the college’s community and practice
re-ontologize what has become hackneyed and empty in pedagogical statements. The
heart of the St. John’s seminar is like that of Heidegger’s “A Dialogue on Language:
between a Japanese and an Inquirer”: in both, tutors face one another in dialectic
sometimes across the table, and between them sit those who are learning to enter the
dialectic and do eventually, in an educational space that is an open clearing, a khôra, and
where, on a good night, Ereignis admits the presencing of Being.
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CONCLUSION
By way of endings for this study, and moving toward conclusion, it seems
appropriate to hearken to Heidegger’s 1964 address, “The End of Philosophy and the
Task of Thinking,” composed and delivered near the end of his working life and a work
that I take to be one of Heidegger’s few, final explicit or implicit thinkings on education
and contributions to our thinking of what is most needed in education in our late modern
age.
With this address, as with most of his speaking opportunities of the middle and
later 1960s (including the controversial Der Spiegel interview of 1966, unpublished until
Heidegger’s death in 1976), Heidegger is trying his hand again, for the sake of future
need, to open a way into what most concerns him and what he takes to be most questionworthy in our late-modern age. What concerns Heidegger in “The End of Philosophy and
the Task of Thinking” and what he takes to be especially question-worthy (as he does in
Contributions to Philosophy and explicitly in What is Called Thinking?) is human beings’
preparation for, readiness for, the task of thinking at the end of philosophy, or more
specifically at the end of philosophy as metaphysics. This preparation, this readiness, is
for Heidegger a matter of education.
What Heidegger means by ‘the end of philosophy’ is not a doomsday scenario or
an end in the sense of “a mere stopping, or lack of continuation, perhaps even as decline
into impotence” (TB 56/GA14: 70). What Heidegger means by “end” is the coming to
completion of a way of thinking, specifically the western philosophical tradition as
metaphysics “turns into the empirical science of man” and completes its development of
separate and independent sciences, such as psychology, cultural anthropology, and the
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new cybernetics (TB 57-8/GA14: 72). It is a completion evident “today in all regions of
beings” (TB 57/GA14: 72). With this coming to completion also come to completion the
modes of thinking that metaphysics has unfolded (such as its distinction of rationality and
irrationality) and metaphysical standpoints toward entities and being itself (Sein/Seyn).
With this coming to completion also comes to completion an epoch in the history of
human intelligibility and that epoch’s intelligibility’s thinking of being itself (Sein/Seyn),
entities, and phenomena. Further, by this coming to completion, thinks Heidegger, the
whole history of philosophy as metaphysics is “gathered into its most extreme
possibility,” Platonism as “reversed Platonism” in the thought of Marx and Nietzsche
(TB 57/GA14: 71).
Though philosophy as metaphysics is in its “final stage” in the thought of Marx
and Nietzsche, Heidegger says it would be “premature” “to conclude” that the end of
philosophy is “a cessation of its way of thinking” (TB 57/GA14: 71). He expects the
future to hold attempts at “epigonal renaissance” of metaphysics, which we might
envision as neo-neo-Platonism or reversals of reversed-Platonism, but as is the essence of
epigones, what is epigonal is imitative and less distinguished than its predecessors. If
eventually in the history of being—the history of what-is as it shows up in human
intelligibility—philosophy as metaphysics were to diminish to absence, would another
philosophy, a mode of thinking other than those of metaphysics and another standpoint
than that of human intelligibility over entities, emerge?
In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Heidegger wants to think,
yes, that another philosophy and modes of thinking other than those of metaphysics and
another standpoint than that of human intelligibility over entities, would emerge. He has
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wanted to think so 1) since the failure of his attempt, as Iain Thomson’s Heidegger on
Ontotheology elucidates, to reunify the independent university sciences by means of their
common origin in the metaphysical philosophy that developed them; and 2) since his
realizing by that failure that manifestations of the inevitable end of metaphysics were the
university’s refusal of a philosophical transformation of its ontic empirical sciences—a
transformative re-essentializing and unifying regrounding of the sciences in their
philosophical origin—and the university’s refusal of philosophy as anything other than its
becoming empirical science too. It is after the failure of his attempt for education to
reunify the university fragmented by its independent sciences and their concerns that
Heidegger, in Contributions to Philosophy, takes up the questions indicated by the title of
the 1964 address “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” Those questions are
“what does it mean that philosophy in its present age has entered its final stage?” and
“what task is reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy?” Heidegger’s educational
project in Contributions to Philosophy was to prepare “future ones” for readiness to think
at the end of philosophy.
Contributions to Philosophy and its project for educational transformation,
turning or shift, in the thinking of those who would be and could be future ones was not
yet published or public in 1964. However, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of
Thinking” speaks the need for such a project and presents reason for that need in its
unfolding of the questions indicated by its title. As Heidegger tells his audience, “the title
designates the attempt at a reflection, which persists in questioning. The questions are
paths to an answer. If the answer could be given, the answer would consist in a

127

transformation of thinking, not in a propositional statement about a matter at stake [italics
mine]” (TB 55/GA14: 69).
That transformation or turning in thinking, as Heidegger’s thinking in the address
realizes, is a transformation away from the propositional statements of metaphysics, its
direction toward “the things [entities] themselves,” its empirical stand over them, and its
realization of truth as correct representation of the common look of entities. It is a
transformation away from the thinking—and its teaching—as depicted in Heidegger’s
poetizing thinking, “Plato's Doctrine of Truth.” The transformation in thinking called for
by “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” is the same as that intended by
Heidegger’s educational project in Contributions to Philosophy and is a transformation to
thinking free of metaphysics and its “light.” Such thinking, Heidegger says, is thinking in
an open clear of, free of, the tradition of metaphysical knowing and its modes of thinking,
proof, and truth. Philosophy as metaphysics, Heidegger says, “knows nothing of [this]
opening.” Instead, in compelling correctness of look and encounter with what-is (as
empirical, rational, encounter), metaphysics compels the ‘closing’ of thinking ‘space,’ a
denial of khôra and a restriction of Ereignis to metaphysical truth happenings.
Such a transformation, such a turning and shift in the form and forming of human
thinking and its intelligibility, is for Heidegger a matter of education. He says explicitly
as he brings “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” to completion,
we all still need an education in thinking, and before that first of
knowledge of what being educated and uneducated in thinking means. In
this respect, Aristotle gives us a hint in Book IV of his Metaphysics
(1006a ff.). It reads: For it is uneducated not to have an eye for when it is
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necessary to look for a proof, and when this is not necessary. (TB
72/GA14: 89)
Looking for proof is a mode of thinking unfolded by metaphysics, as is the designation
and distinction of what is rational and irrational. In an educative calling of his audience
toward what Heidegger thinks to be preparatory or transitional thinking on the way to the
possibility of other modes of thinking and other philosophies, Heidegger asks, “doesn’t
the insistence on what is demonstrable block the way to what-is? (that is, to being-itself
(Sein/Seyn)?),” and wonders, “perhaps there is a thinking which is more sober than the
irresistible race of rationalization and the sweeping character of cybernetics” (TB
72/GA14: 89).
Reflecting—thinking—into the opening opened by his question and wondering,
Heidegger continues, “For it is not yet decided in what way that which needs no proof in
order to become accessible to thinking is to be experienced. Is it dialectical mediation
[like that of “A Dialogue on Language”] or originary intuition or neither of the two?”
(TB 72/GA14: 89) Heidegger continues, “philosophy [as metaphysics] does speak about
the light of reason, but does not heed the opening of Being [being-itself (Sein/Seyn)]. The
lumen naturale, the light of reason, throws light only on openness. It does concern the
opening, but so little does it form it that it needs it in order to be able to illuminate what is
present in the opening.” (TB 66/GA14: 83). The forming of the opening that
metaphysics’ “light of reason” does little to form is the essential forming of Heideggerian
education, and it is a forming that happens in—and as—the essential being, the ownmost
being, of human being. Becoming open, or more specifically, becoming an opening in
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which, and by which, thinking—within and without metaphysics—happens, as Ereignis
is genuine educational transformation, is paideia, for Heidegger.
Such educational transformation is a liberating education and is the essence of
liberal education as Heidegger thinks it. This is not liberal education as education
concerned with bringing forth the subjective I of metaphysical modernism or the
liberalism or liberal democracy that modernism unfolds. Instead it is liberal education
allowing for, as that Jacob Klein’s St. John's College does, a liberation as re-opening of
essential human being from its narrowing through metaphysics’ fundamental ontology, a
liberation from the view of human being only as the rational animal thinking beyond
beings to their beingness and, then, forgetting being-itself.
To consider the matter of ‘Heidegger and education’ only in light of Heidegger’s
becoming the first Nazi rector of Freiburg University is to miss Heidegger’s prescient
insight into the plights of our late-modern 70,000 student universities, insight that
Heidegger realized in confrontation with Nazism and its expression of our late-modern
Nietzschean ontotheology, will-to-power. It is also to miss too Heidegger’s efforts in
Contributions to Philosophy especially to think the task of thinking apart from the
metaphysical philosophy and tradition that unfolded to late-modern Nietzschean nihilism
and its plights, including the plights of late-modern education, its institutions, and its
practices. To realize genuine education, to allow for it, thinks Heidegger we must think
through, but also apart from, the western philosophical tradition as metaphysics, its
ontotheologies, and the worlds it has realized, including those of its education. Thinking
with Plato and Plato’s Cave Allegory, as Heidegger interprets it, genuine education is not
filling an opening with what is presumed known or ‘proven’: genuine education does not
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consist in merely pouring knowledge into the unprepared soul as if it were some
container—a jug—held out empty and waiting.” “On the contrary, thinks Heidegger
through Plato, but also apart from Plato in “Plato's Doctrine of Truth,” “real education
lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the
place of our essential being and accustoming us to it.” That essential being, as Heidegger
thinks it in Contributions to Philosophy and reiterates it in “The End of Philosophy and
the Task of Thinking,” is an open clearing wherein human being encounters what-is.
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